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Abstract
Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice where the space of social al-
ternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (‘views’) on a family of logically inter-
connected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Unfortunately, simply complying with the
majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judge-
ments. Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views
which agree with the majority in as many issues as possible. Any element of this
set can be obtained through a process of diachronic judgement aggregation, where
the evaluations of the individual issues are decided through a sequence of majority
votes unfolding over time, with earlier decisions possibly imposing logical constraints
on later decisions. Thus, for a fixed profile of votes, the ultimate social choice can
depend on the order in which the issues are decided; this is called path dependence.
We investigate the size and structure of the Condorcet set —and hence the scope and
severity of path-dependence —for several important classes of judgement aggregation
problems.
In the context of preference aggregation, pairwise majority voting often fails to produce
unambiguous outcomes because a Condorcet winner might not exist. Similarly, in the
general judgement aggregation problem where each social outcome is described as a pattern
of yes/no answers to certain interrelated propositions, issue-wise majority voting frequently
fails to produce consistent collective judgement sets; see Guilbaud (1966) and Kornhauser
and Sager (1986). This observation has sparked off the recent literature on judgement
aggregation, starting from the influential contribution List and Pettit (2002); see List and
Puppe (2009) for a survey.
In this paper, we propose a natural solution to the problem of inconsistency of issue-
wise majority voting that is based entirely on majoritarian principles: the Condorcet set.
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A collection of yes/no answers to all propositions is called a ‘view.’ A logically consistent
view is Condorcet admissible if there is no other logically consistent view that endorses
a strictly larger set of propositions which are supported by a majority of voters. The
Condorcet set is defined as the set of all Condorcet admissible views; it is thus the largest
set of views which are defensible on purely ‘majoritarian’ grounds —in particular it always
coincides with the issue-wise majority view whenever the latter is consistent.
The normative content of Condorcet admissibility is non-trivial. We illustrate this
in the context of preference aggregation. In particular, we show that the optimal choices
associated with any Condorcet admissible preference ordering are contained in the top cycle
of the majority tournament. In this manner, Condorcet admissibility yields a foundation
of a weakening of the criterion of Smith consistency in voting theory. Notably, Condorcet
admissibility, like Smith consistency, excludes otherwise natural-looking and putatively
majoritarian voting rules such as the Simpson-Kramer (maxmin) rule.
The Condorcet set naturally arises from a ‘diachronic’ interpretation of the aggregation
problem in which decisions unfold over time and previous decisions potentially restrict
later decisions due to the logical interrelation of propositions; a corresponding model of
judgement aggregation has been studied by List (2004). Here, we show that a consistent
view (over all issues) is an element of the Condorcet set if and only if there exists an
ordering of issues (a ‘path’) such that the given view arises from ‘sequential majority
voting,’ i.e. from deciding each issue by majority voting in the specified ordering provided
that the issue is not yet determined by previous decisions. Evidently, an aggregation
problem will exhibit path-dependence whenever the Condorcet set has at least two elements,
i.e. whenever (simultaneous) issue-by-issue majority voting is inconsistent.1
From an applied viewpoint, the diachronic perspective on the judgement aggregation
problem is important since, in reality, many social decisions are made in a piecemeal
fashion, with different aspects decided at different times. For example, jurisprudence is
constrained by a body of ‘legal precedents’ (past court decisions) which accumulate over
time. It is often viewed as important or even essential that later court decisions be consis-
tent with earlier legal precedents.2 If the extant body of legal precedents is regarded as an
expression of some ‘social decision’, then this social decision is not made instantaneously,
but is accumulated over many decades.
Unlike courts, legislatures have the power to override their own past decisions and
reverse previous legislation. However, in many cases, the political or economic costs of
doing this are so great that prior legislation is effectively irreversible; thus, legislatures are
often de facto constrained by their past decisions.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the properties of the Condorcet set,
considered as a solution concept for judgement aggregation. A natural question concerns
the size of the Condorcet set and thus the extent of path-dependence. In a nutshell, we show
that, frequently, the Condorcet set can be large. In particular, we focus on the question
on when the Condorcet set at a given profile contains views that either affirm or negate
1It follows from results in Nehring and Puppe (2007), an aggregation problem exhibits path-
independence, i.e. the Condorcet set is a singleton for all profiles, only under very restrictive conditions:
it must have the structure of a median space (see Section 1 below).
2Of course, a higher court can overrule the decision of a lower court, but not vice versa.
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any particular proposition. We refer to such profiles as issue-wise indeterminate, and to
aggregation problems as issue-wise indeterminate if they admit an issue-wise indeterminate
profile. The central result of the paper, Theorem 4.3, characterizes issue-wise indeterminate
profiles and aggregation problems in terms of the combinatorial structure of the logical
interrelations characterizing the aggregation space. Using this general characterization,
we show that many interesting aggregation problems are indeed issue-wise indeterminate,
and that such indeterminacy can arise quite easily. In fact, outside the class of median
spaces there do not seem to be many interesting aggregation problems that are not issue-
wise indeterminate. Our results can be viewed as counterparts to the classical results of
McKelvey (1979) for general judgment aggregation problems.
An even stronger notion of total indeterminacy arises if the Condorcet set equals the
entire set of consistent views. While this can never happen in preference aggregation
problems, it can happen in some interesting aggregation problems, but apparently only
in very special cases. On the other hand, based on a quantitative measure of ‘Condorcet
entropy,’ we also show that quite often aggregation problems admit profiles that are ‘almost’
totally indeterminate.
Another way to assess the severity of path-dependence is in terms of violations of unan-
imous judgments. We characterize the aggregation problems for which sequential majority
voting can lead to the situation that a previous majority decision force the rejection of
a proposition that is unanimously accepted. We show that this can occur (for some dis-
tribution of individual judgments) unless all logical interrelation between propositions are
confined to implications in which the antecedent consists of the conjunction of at most two
propositions. Evidently, this is a very special case; the result thus shows that unanimity
violations are indeed typical. In special cases, however, one can prevent unanimity viola-
tions to occur by an appropriate design of the decision path; in particular, we show how
this can be done in the case of preference aggregation adapting the so-called ‘multi-stage
elimination’ tree of Shepsle and Weingast (1984).
A subsidiary goal of the paper is to illustrate the unity and diversity of (majoritarian)
judgment aggregation theory. To this purpose, we show how the same core concepts and
abstract characterizations apply to range of paradigmatic judgment aggregation problems
which include preference aggregation, classification via equivalence relations, committee
selection and resource allocation, and problems of ‘horizontal equity.’ The latter reflects a
fundamental requirement of the rule of law, dating back at least to Aristotle, that equal
cases should be treated equally, and similar cases similarly.
This paper is organized as follows. In §1, we introduce terminology and notation. In
§2, we explore path-dependence in some paradigmatic judgement aggregation problems:
preference aggregation, committee selection, resource allocation, and models of horizontal
equity. In §3, we characterize when Condorcet admissible elements can override even a
unanimous consensus of voters on some issues. In §4 we consider issue-wise indeterminacy,
where the Condorcet set manifests disagreement about the truth-value of every proposition.
In §5, we study total indeterminacy, where the Condorcet set contains every admissible
view. Finally, in §6, we introduce Condorcet entropy: a quantitative measure of how close
to total indeterminacy a judgement aggregation problem is. For ease of reading, all but
the simplest proofs are relegated to an Appendix at the end of the paper.
3
1 Condorcet admissibility
1.1 Definition and basic facts
Let K ∈ N, and let [1...K] index a set of propositions or issues. An element x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xK) ∈ {0, 1}K is called a view, and interpreted as an assignment of a truth
value of ‘true’ or ‘false’ to each proposition.3 Not all views are feasible, because there
will be logical constraints between the propositions (determined by the structure of the
underlying decision problem faced by society). Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K be the set of ‘admissible’
or consistent views; a given set X ⊆ {0, 1}K is also referred to as an ‘aggregation problem.’
An anonymous profile is a probability measure on X —that is, a function µ : X−→[0, 1]
such that
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1 with the interpretation that, for all x ∈ X, µ(x) is the propor-
tion of the voters who hold the view x. For any Y ⊆ X, define µ(Y ) :=∑y∈Y µ(y). Let
∆(X) be the set of all anonymous profiles. For any µ ∈ ∆(X), any k ∈ [1...K], let
µk(1) := µ{x ∈ X ; xk = 1} (1)
be the total ‘popular support’ for the position “xk = 1,’ and let µk(0) := 1 − µk(1).
Let ∆∗ (X) := {µ ∈ ∆(X); µk(1) 6= 12 , ∀k ∈ [1...K]} be the set of anonymous pro-
files where there is a strict majority supporting either 0 or 1 in each coordinate.4 An
anonymous judgement aggregation rule is a correspondence (i.e. multivalued function)
F : ∆∗ (X)⇉ {0, 1}K . Most of the rules we will consider are single-valued, taking the form
of a function F : ∆∗ (X)−→{0, 1}K . For example, the propositionwise majoritarian judge-
ment aggregation rule Maj : ∆∗ (X)−→{0, 1}K is defined as follows: for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
Majk(µ) := 1 if µk(1) >
1
2
, and Majk(µ) := 0 if µk(1) <
1
2
.
It is quite common to find that Maj(µ) 6∈ X —the ‘majority ideal’ can be inconsistent
with the underlying logical constraints faced by society.5 However, a basic principle of
majoritarianism is that we should try to satisfy the majority’s will in as many coordinates
as possible. Formally, for any x ∈ X, denote by M(x, µ) := {k ∈ [1...K] ; xk = Majk(µ)}
the set of coordinates in which x coincides with the ‘majority will.’ We want M(x, µ) to
be as large as possible. In the setting of preference aggregation (where the coordinates
encode the orderings between pairs of alternatives), this principle was first advocated by
Condorcet (1785). Thus, we will say that an element x ∈ X is Condorcet admissible if there
does not exist any y ∈ X such thatM(x, µ) (M(y, µ). Let Cond (X,µ) ⊆ X be the set of
Condorcet admissible elements. A profile µ is called Condorcet determinate if Cond (X,µ)
is single-valued.
3There are several different terms in the literature: e.g., Dokow and Holzman (2010) speak of ‘binary
evaluations,’ List and Puppe (2009) use the term ‘judgement set.’
4Usually, judgement aggregation is considered on all of ∆(X). However, our goal in this paper is to
investigate the multiplicity of solutions in the Condorcet set of a single profile; for this goal it is convenient
to eliminate the ‘spurious’ multiplicities which arise when µk(1) =
1
2
for some k ∈ [1...K]. Thus, we
will confine our attention to profiles in ∆∗ (X) for expositional simplicity. (If the set of voters is large
(respectively odd), then a profile in ∆(X) \∆∗ (X) is highly unlikely (resp. impossible) anyways.)
5Condorcet’s ‘voting paradox’ is a well-known instance; another example that has received considerable
interest recently is the so-called ‘discursive dilemma,’ see Kornhauser and Sager (1986), List and Pettit
(2002), and List and Puppe (2009) for an overview of the subsequent literature.
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For any x,y, z ∈ {0, 1}K , say that y is between x and z if, for all k ∈ [1...K], (xk =
zk = 0) =⇒ (yk = 0) and (xk = zk = 1) =⇒ (yk = 1). Furthermore, y is said to be properly
between x and z if, in addition, x 6= y 6= z. For any x ∈ X and z ∈ {0, 1}K , write x ≍ z if
there exists no y ∈ X which is properly between x and z.
Lemma 1.1 (a) If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then Cond (X,µ) = {Maj(µ)}.
(b) Otherwise, Cond (X,µ) = {x ∈ X ; x ≍ Maj(µ)}.
In this case, |Cond (X,µ) | ≥ 3.
1.2 Condorcet admissible aggregation rules
An aggregation rule F : ∆∗ (X) ⇉ {0, 1}K is Condorcet admissible if F (µ) ⊆ Cond (X,µ)
for any X and µ. The concept of Condorcet admissibility can be viewed as a normative
extension of Condorcet consistency, i.e. the requirement that the majority view is chosen
whenever it is feasible. It can be viewed as summarizing the normative implications (for
single profiles) of the majoritarian viewpoint per se.
Condorcet admissible rules arise naturally in the following way. Consider a gain function
φ :
[−1
2
, 1
2
]−→R, assumed to be non-decreasing and odd (i.e. φ(r) = −φ(−r)) with φ(r) < 0
for all r < 0 and φ(r) > 0 for all r > 0. For any such function, and strictly positive weights
λk > 0 with
∑
k∈[1...K] λk = 1, define the weighted φ-support rule Fφ,λ : ∆
∗ (X)⇉ X by
Fφ,λ(µ) := argmax
x∈X
∑
k∈[1...K]
λk · φ[µk(xk)− 12 ]. (2)
In particular, if φ(r) = sign(r) for all r ∈ [−1
2
, 1
2
]
and λk = 1/K for all k, then Fφ,λ is the
Slater rule:
Slater (X,µ) := argmax
x∈X
#
{
k ∈ [1...K] ; µk(xk) > 12
}
. (3)
The Slater rule selects the consistent views that maximize the number of issues in which
there is agreement with the majority will. This rule was first suggested by Slater (1961) in
the setting of Arrovian preference aggregation, in which it selects the transitive orderings
that agree with the majority tournament in the largest number of binary comparisons.6
On the other hand, suppose φ(r) = r for all r ∈ [−1
2
, 1
2
]
and λk = 1/K for all k; the
corresponding Fφ,λ is called the median rule:
Median (X,µ) = argmax
x∈X
∑
k∈[1...K]
µk(xk).
The median rule selects the consistent view(s) that maximize(s) the sum of the popular
support over each issue. In the setting of Arrovian preference aggregation, it corresponds
6An alternative description of the Slater rule is as follows. Let dH be the Hamming distance,
i.e. dH(x,y) = #{k ∈ [1...K] ; xk 6= yk} for all x,y ∈ {0, 1}K . It is easily verified that Slater (X,µ) =
argminx∈X dH [x,Maj(µ)]; that is, the Slater rule selects the consistent view(s) that minimize the Ham-
ming distance to the propositionwise majority view.
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to the Kemeny (1959) rule, which has been analyzed by Young and Levenglick (1978) and
Young (1986, 1988, 1995, 1997). As a general-purpose judgement aggregation rule, the
median rule has been studied among others by Barthe´le´my and Monjardet (1981, 1988),
Barthe´le´my (1989) and Barthe´le´my and Janowitz (1991).7
Proposition 1.2 Any weighted support rule Fφ,λ is Condorcet admissible. Conversely, for
any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), any x ∈ Cond (X,µ), and any gain function φ, there exist weights λk > 0
such that Fφ,λ(µ) = {x}.
Normatively, there will frequently be additional considerations (that are not properly
majoritarian) that privilege some Condorcet admissible views over others. Of particular
interest here are considerations of symmetry; these give prominence to unweighted support
rules which are studied in detail in Nehring and Pivato (2011b).
1.3 Sequential majority voting
Condorcet admissibility is closely related to ‘sequential’ majority voting, as follows. For
any y = (yk)
K
k=1 ∈ {0, 1}K and J ⊂ [1...K], define yJ := (yj)j∈J ∈ {0, 1}J . For any
i ∈ [1...K] \J , say that yi is X-consistent with yJ if there exists some x ∈ X with xJ = yJ
and xi = yi —otherwise yi is X-inconsistent with yJ . A path through [1...K] is a bijection
γ : [1...K]−→[1...K]. We now define the γ-sequential majority rule F γ : ∆∗ (X)−→X. Let
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and let z := Maj(µ). Define y := F γ(µ) ∈ X inductively as follows:
• Define yγ(1) := zγ(1).
• Inductively, let J := {γ(1), γ(2), . . . , γ(n)}, and suppose we have already decided yJ .
Let i := γ(n + 1). If zi is X-consistent with yJ , then set yi := zi. Otherwise, set
yi = ¬zi.8
From a ‘normative’ perspective, the support rules (2) are interesting because they have
many nice properties which may be desirable in certain sorts of judgement aggregation
(Nehring and Pivato, 2011b). However, from a ‘descriptive’ perspective, sequential major-
ity rules may be more relevant, because they describe the historical process through which
decisions are often made in the real world. In this setting, a key issue is path-dependence;
for a related approach to path-dependence in diachronic judgement aggregation, see List
(2004).
The profile µ is path-dependent if there exist paths γ and ξ such that F γ(µ) 6= F ξ(µ).
Path dependence is pernicious in at least two ways:
• Suppose the path γ is random and exogenous (e.g. the decisions on individual co-
ordinates in [1...K] are made on an ad hoc basis, in response to political or legal
exigencies of random origin). If µ is path-dependent, then the ultimate social choice
F γ(µ) will be, to some extent, random and arbitrary.
7It is easily verified that Median (X,µ) = argminx∈X
∑
y∈X µ(y) · dH(x,y); that is, the median rule
selects the consistent view(s) that minimize the average Hamming distance to the views of the voters.
8“¬” represents logical negation. That is: ¬1 := 0 and ¬0 := 1.
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• Suppose the path γ is chosen by an ‘agenda setter’ (e.g. the chairperson of a com-
mittee). If µ is path-dependent, then the agenda setter can choose γ strategically, so
as to manipulate the outcome F γ(µ).
Path dependence is closely related to the Condorcet set because of the next result:
Proposition 1.3 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K .
(a) For any path γ through [1...K], the rule F γ is Condorcet admissible.
(b) Conversely, for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and x ∈ Cond (X,µ), there exists a path γ such
that F γ(µ) = x.
A profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-independent if F γ(µ) = F ξ(µ) for any two paths γ and ξ
through [1...K]. The space X itself is called path-independent if every µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-
independent. Furthermore, X is majoritarian-consistent if Maj(µ) ∈ X for all µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
i.e. if all profiles are Condorcet determinate. Let J ⊆ [1...K] and consider w ∈ {0, 1}J
which corresponds to a subset of judgements on the issues in J . The set J is the support
of w, denoted supp (w). We define |w| := |J |. If I ⊆ J and v ∈ {0, 1}I , then we say v
is a fragment of w (and write v ⊑ w) if v = wI . Furthermore, w is a forbidden fragment
for X if, for all x ∈ X, we have xJ 6= w. Finally, w is a critical fragment if it is a minimal
forbidden fragment —that is, w is forbidden, and there exists no proper subfragment
v < w such that v is forbidden.9 Let W (X) be the set of critical fragments for X, and let
κ(X) := max {|w| ; w ∈ W (X)}.
A particular role is played by spaces X ⊆ {0, 1}K for which κ(X) = 2; these are
known as median spaces in combinatorial mathematics. Their importance in the theory
of aggregation has been emphasized by (Barthe´le´my and Monjardet, 1981; Nehring and
Puppe, 2007, 2010). Note that a set of feasible views X is a median space if and only if
all logical interrelations are confined to simple implications: for some j, k and all x ∈ X,
xj = 0 implies that xk = 0, or xj = 0 implies that xk = 1.
Proposition 1.4 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K . The following are equivalent: [i] X is path-independent;
[ii] X is Condorcet determinate; [iii] X is a median space, i.e. κ(X) = 2.
Proof: “[i] ⇐⇒ [ii]” follows immediately from Lemma 1.1 and Proposition 1.3. “[ii] ⇐⇒
[iii]” follows from (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Fact 3.4). 2
Notation. We define the elements 0K := (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1K := (1, 1, . . . , 1) in {0, 1}K (we
will simply write “0” and “1” when K is clear from context). For any subset J ⊆ [1...K],
let 1J denote the vector x ∈ {0, 1}K such that xj = 1 for all j ∈ J and xk = 0 for all
k ∈ [1...K] \ J .
9Critical fragments are called ‘critical families’ in Nehring and Puppe (2007, 2010) and ‘minimal infea-
sible partial evaluations (MIPEs)’ in Dokow and Holzman (2010) .
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2 Examples
2.1 Preference aggregation
Let N ∈ N, let [1...N ] be some set of N social alternatives, let K := N(N − 1)/2, and
bijectively identify [1...K] with a subset of [1...N ] × [1...N ] which contains exactly one
element of the set {(n,m), (m,n)} for each distinct n,m ∈ [1...N ]. Then {0, 1}K represents
the space of all tournaments (i.e. complete, irreflexive, antisymmetric binary relations, or
equivalently, complete directed graphs) on [1...N ]. Let XprN ⊂ {0, 1}K be the set of all
tournaments representing total orderings (i.e. permutations) of [1...N ] (sometimes called
the permutahedron). Classical Arrovian aggregation of strict preference orderings is simply
judgement aggregation on XprN . For any profile µ ∈ ∆∗(XprN ), the set Cond (XprN , µ) is the set
of preference orderings on [1...N ] such that no other ordering agrees with the µ-majority
on a larger set of pairwise comparisons.
Note that in the case of preference aggregation, Condorcet admissibility always restricts
the set of admissible elements, i.e. Cond (XprN , µ) is never all of X
pr
N . For example, if a ma-
jority of voters strictly prefer a to b in the profile µ, then no element of Cond (XprN , µ)
can place a and b as nearest neighbours with b ≻ a, because switching the social rank-
ing between a and b while retaining all other comparisons would agree with the majority
view on a strictly larger set of issues. Note also that Condorcet determinacy in the sense
defined above is stronger than the usual notion of existence of a Condorcet winner. In-
deed, Condorcet determinacy in our sense requires the existence of an entire ordering that
agrees with the majority judgement in each binary comparison; it is thus equivalent to the
existence of a Condorcet winner on each subset of [1...N ].
For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , let x≺ be the binary relation on [1...N ] defined by x. Moreover, for
any µ ∈ ∆∗ (XprN ), let
µ≺ be the binary relation defined by Maj(µ) —the so-called majority
tournament. An element c ∈ XprN is called a directed Hamiltonian chain of Maj(µ) if all
nearest-neighbour orderings in
c≺ agree with the orderings specified by µ≺. In other words,
if we represent
c≺ as a linear directed graph C and represent µ≺ as a complete directed
graph D in the obvious way, then C is a (directed) subgraph of D.
Let
x∗ be the transitive closure of
x≺, augmented by all pairs (n, n) for n ∈ [1...N ]; then
x∗ is a weak order (i.e. it is complete, reflexive and transitive). If x≈∗ is the symmetric part
of
x∗, then x≈∗ is an equivalence relation (one has n x≈∗ m iff ‘n and m belong to the same
cycle of
x≺’). The x≈∗-equivalence classes of [1...N ] are linearly ordered by the asymmetric
part
x≺∗ of
x∗ (one has n
x≺∗ m iff ‘n is on a lower
x≺-cycle than m’).10
Proposition 2.1 Let µ ∈ ∆(XprN ).
(a) Cond (XprN , µ) = {x ∈ XprN ;
x≺ is a Hamiltonian chain in µ≺}.
(b) For all n,m ∈ [1...N ], n µ≺∗ m if and only if, for all x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ), n
x≺ m.
10For a choice-theoretic analysis of the relation
x∗ see Duggan (2007).
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As an illustrative example, consider the 4-permutahedron with alternatives a, b, c, d.
Suppose that one third of the population endorses each of the preference orderings a ≻
b ≻ c ≻ d, b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a and c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b. For the corresponding majority tournament
we have c
µ≻ a, d µ≻ a, a µ≻ b, b µ≻ c, b µ≻ d, and c µ≻ d (see Figure 1). By Proposition
2.1 (a), the Condorect efficient set consists of the following five orderings: a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d,
b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b, d ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c, c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d.
b d
a
c
 
  	
6
-
@
@@R  
  
@
@@I
Figure 1: A majority tournament on four alternatives
Condorcet admissibility as applied in the present section concerns the aggregation of
individual preferences into a social preference. What are the implications for social choice
rules, i.e. for mappings that specify a chosen element for each non-empty subset? The
following result gives an answer to this question. Given a profile µ, an element n ∈ A ⊆
[1...N ] is called Condorcet rationalizable in A if there exists x ∈ Cond (X,µ) such that n is
a maximal element of A with respect to the ordering x. For all non-empty A ⊆ [1...N ],
denote by C∗(A, µ) ⊆ A the set of Condorcet rationalizable elements in A.
Proposition 2.2 Let µ ∈ ∆(XprN ) and n ∈ A ⊆ [1...N ]. Then, n ∈ C∗(A, µ) if and only if
n is
µ∗-maximal in A.
The result shows that the choice function C∗ is binary, i.e. results from the maximization
of a binary relation, since for all A ⊆ [1...N ],
C∗(A, µ) = {m ∈ A; n
µ∗ m for all n ∈ A}.
Proposition 2.2 implies in particular that, if the feasible set A agrees with the domain
of preferences [1...N ], an alternative is Condorcet rationalizable if and only if it is an
element of the maximal
µ≈∗-equivalence class, which is also known as the top cycle of the
majority tournament
µ≺ (Moulin, 1988, p.253). However, if A is a proper subset of [1...N ],
alternatives may be Condorcet rationalizable even if they are not in the top cycle. For
example, if A = {a, b} then b may be Condorcet rationalizable (together with a) even
though a is preferred by a strict majority to b. While this may look counterintuitive at
first, it makes good sense from the perspective of Condorcet admissibility as capturing
the normative implications of majoritarianism per se. Consider, for instance, the triple
a, b, c, and suppose that in the majority tournament a
µ≻ b, b µ≻ c, c µ≻ a the smallest
supermajority margin is at a
µ≻ b. Then, by an argument dating back to Condorcet, one
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can argue for the selection of the ordering b ≻ c ≻ a as the unique ‘best supported’ social
preference ordering, with an attendant choice of b over a in the feasible set {a, b}.11
As a corollary, the concept of ‘Smith consistency,’ i.e. the requirement that choice
should always be from the top cycle (Smith, 1973; Moulin, 1988, p.241), turns out to be
too strong a normative requirement for majoritarianism as such.12
While thus weaker than Smith consistency, Condorcet rationalizability has substan-
tial and non-trivial implications beyond Condorcet consistency. An illustrative example is
the Simpson-Kramer (maxmin) rule according to which the alternative with the highest
minimal popular support in all binary comparisons is chosen. Consider the set of alterna-
tives {a, b, c, d, e,m} and a profile that gives equal weight to the following five preference
orderings (see Duggan (2010)): a ≻ b ≻ m ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e, b ≻ c ≻ m ≻ d ≻ e ≻ a,
c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ m ≻ a ≻ b, d ≻ e ≻ a ≻ m ≻ b ≻ c, e ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ m. As is easily
verified, alternative m is the unique Simpson-Kramer winner since it looses with 2/5 of
the votes against every other alternative, while each other alternative looses against some
alternative with only 1/5 of the votes. However, the top cycle set is given by {a, b, c, d, e};
hence, by Proposition 2.1 (b), the unique Simpson-Kramer winner is never the top element
of a Condorcet admissible preference ordering, and, by Proposition 2.2, it is not chosen by
C∗.
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2.2 Committee selection and resource allocation
For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , let ‖x‖ := #{k ∈ [1...K] ; xk = 1}. Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and define
XcomI,J ;K :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K ; I ≤ ‖x‖ ≤ J}. (4)
Heuristically, [1...K] is a set of K ‘candidates’, and XcomI,J ;K is the set of all ‘committees’
comprised of at least I and at most J of these candidates.14 The next result follows
immediately from Lemma 1.1:
Proposition 2.3 Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K and let µ ∈ ∆(XcomI,J ;K). Let M := {k ∈ [1...K];
µ[xj] >
1
2
} be the set of all ‘candidates’ receiving majority support.
(a) If I ≤ |M | ≤ J , then Cond (X,µ) = {1M}.
(b) If |M | < I, then Cond (X,µ) = {1H ; M ⊂ H ⊆ [1...K], and |H| = I}.
11This ordering is in fact chosen by the median rule, or more generally, by any unweighted suport rule.
12Smith consistency can be viewed as a version of Condorcet rationalizability where the domain of
preferences used in the aggregation results from restricting the underlying preferences to the respective
feasible sets, i.e. Smith consistency results from Condorcet rationalizability under a weak version of IIA.
13The example is by no means exceptional or ‘non generic.’ Indeed, Nehring and Pivato (2011a) provide
a general method to construct profiles that generate any given set of supermajority ratios in the binary
comparison between alternatives (possibly with a large set of voters).
14The committee selection problem appears to have a long history in social choice theory; according to
McLean (1990) the aggregation problem corresponding to Xcom7,7;20 was studied by Ramon Lull already in
the year 1274 in his ‘Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men.’ For a closely related model interpreted
in terms of ‘community standards,’ see Miller (2009).
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(c) If |M | > J , then Cond (X,µ) = {1H ; H ⊆M and |H| = J}.
Next, fix M,D ∈ N, and consider the D-dimensional ‘discrete cube’ [0...M ]D. Then
each element x ∈ [1...M ]D can be represented by a point Φ(x) := x˜ ∈ {0, 1}D×M defined
as follows:
for all (d,m) ∈ [1...D]× [1...M ], x˜(d,m) :=
{
1 if xd ≥ m;
0 if xd < m.
(5)
(For example, Φ(0D) = 0D×M and Φ(1D) = 1D×M). This defines an injection Φ :
[0...M ]D−→{0, 1}D×M . Any subset of P ⊂ [0...M ]D can thereby be represented as a
subset X := Φ(P ) ⊂ {0, 1}D×M . Judgement aggregation over X thus represents social
choice over a D-dimensional ‘policy space’, where each voter’s position represents her ideal
point in P , the set of feasible policies. This framework is especially useful for resource
allocation problems, as we now illustrate. Let
△DM :=
{
x ∈ [0...M ]D ;
D∑
d=1
xd = M
}
,
and X∆M,D := Φ[△DM ] ⊂ {0, 1}D×M .
(6)
Geometrically, △DM is a ‘discrete simplex’; points in △DM represent all ways of allocating M
indivisible dollars amongst exactly D claimants. Thus, judgement aggregation over X∆M,D
describes a group which decides how to allocate a budget ofM dollars towards D claimants
by voting ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ to propositions of the form ‘xd should be at least m dollars’ for
each d ∈ [1...D] and m ∈ [1...M ]; see Lindner et al. (2010).
On the space X∆M,D, the Condorcet set allows for the following explicit characterization.
For each d ∈ [1...D] and µ, let m∗d := medd(µ) denote the median in coordinate d (that
is: m∗d is the unique m ∈ [0 . . .M ] such that µ(xd,m) > 12 > µ(xd,m+1)}; this value exists
because µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,D)). It follows that Maj(µ) = Φ(m∗1, . . . ,m∗D) (see Lemma A.1(b)).
Let D(µ) :=
(∑D
d=1m
∗
d
)
−M be the ‘majority deficit’ corresponding to the profile µ. Note
that the majority deficit can be positive or negative.
Proposition 2.4 Let M,D ∈ N, and let µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,D).
• If D(µ) = 0, then Cond (X∆M,D, µ) = Maj(µ).
• If D(µ) > 0, then Cond (X∆M,D, µ) = {Φ(x); x ∈ △DM and xd ∈ [m∗d −D(µ), m∗d]
for all d ∈ [1 . . . D]}.
• If D(µ) < 0, then Cond (X∆M,D, µ) = {Φ(x); x ∈ △DM and xd ∈ [m∗d, m∗d + |D(µ)|]
for all d ∈ [1 . . . D]}.
Thus, a profile µ is Condorcet determinate if and only if D(µ) = 0. Moreover, if there
is positive (negative) deficit, the Condorcet set arises by allocating at most (at least) the
median amount to each claimant while distributing the slack in any feasible way. In the
space X∆M,D, the size of the Condorcet admissible set is thus directly determined by the
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absolute value of the majority deficit | D(µ) |, which can be viewed as the ‘degree of
Condorcet-indeterminacy.’
Note also that, if D > 2, it is quite possible that medd(µ) = 0 for all d ∈ [1...D];
for instance, this will be the case if there are sufficiently many voters and every voter is
only interested in positive quantities of less than half of the goods d ∈ [1...D] (provided
that the relevant sets of goods differ across voters). By Proposition 2.4, one obtains
Cond
(
X∆M,D, µ
)
= X∆M,D in this case, so that the entailed path-dependence is maximal; in
Section 5 below, we will refer to this as ‘total indeterminacy’ (cf. Example 5.1 (b) below).
Both XcomI,J ;K and X
∆
M,D are examples of allocation spaces. Let M,D ∈ N, and fix
constants 0 ≤ S ≤ S and 0 ≤ Ad ≤ Ad ≤ S for all d ∈ [1...D]. Let S := (S, S) and
A := (Ad, Ad)
D
d=1; the data (D,S,A) defines an allocation polytope:
PDS,A :=
{
m ∈ [0...M ]D ; S ≤
D∑
d=1
md ≤ S and Ad ≤ md ≤ Ad, ∀ d ∈ [1...D]
}
. (7)
Let XDS,A := Φ[P
D
S,A] ⊂ {0, 1}D×M ; then XDS,A is called an allocation space. Heuristically,
XDS,A represents a set of feasible allocations of M indivisible ‘resource units’ (e.g. dollars,
committee positions) amongst some set of D claimants, with lower and upper bounds on
the total allocation (given by S and S), and possibly with minimal and maximal amounts
for each claimant (given by (Ad, Ad)
D
d=1). For example:
• Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K. Set S := I, S := J , M := 1 and D := K, and set ad := 0
and ad := 1 for all d ∈ [1...D]. Then PDS,A =
{
a ∈ {0, 1}K ; I ≤
K∑
k=1
ak ≤ J
}
. Thus,
XDS,A = X
com
I,J ;K .
• Let M ∈ N. Set S = S = M , and set Ad = M and ad = 0 for all d ∈ [1...D]. Then
PDS,A = △DM is the ‘discrete simplex’ in eqn.(6). Thus, XDS,A = X∆M,D.
Theorem 2.5 Let X be any allocation space and let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X). Then Cond (X,µ) =
Slater (X,µ).
Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 are corollaries to Theorem 2.5 applied toX = XcomI,J ;K andX
∆
M,D,
respectively. It is worth emphasizing that, unlike in allocation spaces, the Slater rule does
not, in general, exhaust the Condorcet set. A simple example is the 4-permutahedron. As
in the example given in the previous subsection, assume that one third of the population
endorses each of the preference orderings a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a and c ≻
d ≻ a ≻ b. As noted above, the Condorcet set consists of the following five orderings:
a ≻1 b ≻1 c ≻1 d, b ≻2 c ≻2 d ≻2 a, c ≻3 d ≻3 a ≻3 b, d ≻4 a ≻4 b ≻4 c, c ≻5
a ≻5 b ≻5 d. As is easily verified, ≻2 agrees with the majority tournament in five binary
comparisons ((a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d)), whereas ≻4 agrees with it only in three issues
((a, b), (a, d), (b, c)); all other orderings agree with the majority tournament in exactly four
issues. Thus, ≻2 is uniquely chosen by the Slater rule.
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2.3 Horizontal Equity
Consider a situation in which an institution, e.g. a parliament, a court, or an academic
department, faces a collection of yes/no decisions s ∈ [1...S] on a set of cases, say on the
acceptability of public utterances, on the negligence of defendants, or on the employability
of job candidates. We will refer to the elements of [1...S] as cases. Every voter and society
must form an opinion on how these cases are to be decided. Let us call a set C ⊆ [1...S] of
positive decisions a standard; a standard thus lists the public utterances that are deemed
acceptable, the defendants that are considered to be guilty of negligence, the candidates
that are considered to be employable, etc. The aggregation problem consists in determining
for each profile of individual standards a social standard. In this context, a notion of
horizontal equity may require that similar cases are to be treated similarly, i.e. that similar
utterances, similar legal cases, similar candidates are to be assessed similarly. Formally,
a norm (of horizontal equity) is a collection C of ‘legitimate’ standards (thus, a norm is
a subset of 2[1...S]). The intended interpretation is that a norm describes a concept of
similarity between cases with the elements of C as the collection of ‘similarity clusters’ of
cases. This superordinate notion of similarity is shared by all individuals in the society
in the sense that there is universal agreement that all legitimate standards, individual as
well as social, have to be similarity clusters, i.e. elements of C. The aggregation problem
arises from the fact that different individuals may hold different standards, and that naive
aggregation procedures may not produce a legitimate standard at the social level. The
following example provides an illustration and will help to clarify the concepts.
Example 2.6 (‘Unfree public speech’) Suppose that a group such as a corporation or
political party decides that it needs to form an opinion about which public utterances are
acceptable. While ready to restrict freedom of speech in this manner, the group acknowl-
edges, however, that it should proceed in a principled manner at least to the extent that
it should apply a consistent standard to opinions uttered by different persons at different
situations.15
Formally, this can be captured by letting each case correspond to a public utterance rep-
resenting a particular position s ∈ [1...S] in the political spectrum, and assume that these
positions can be ordered from left to right such that, say, 1 < 2 < ... < S. Every individual
and society have to form an opinion about which public utterances are acceptable, i.e. have
to determine a legitimate standard. In this example, a natural restriction is to require that
a position that is in between two acceptable position with respect to the ordering < must
be acceptable as well, in other words, to require that legitimate standards must form in-
tervals on the spectrum of positions. The underlying ‘horizontal’ equity norm is thus given
by the collection Cline of all intervals with respect to the ordering <.
How, in this context, can one aggregate the individual standards into a social standard in
order to decide on collective acceptability? A natural way to individuate the decisions is to
identify each case s ∈ [1...S] with an issue k ∈ [1...K] on which individuals cast a vote. An
element x ∈ {0, 1}K thus corresponds to a collection of cases with xk = 1 (xk = 0) denoting
15We are not advocating restrictions on freedom of speech, of course, but situations as sketched here
happen empirically, with more or less respect for the ‘rule of law.’
13
a positive (negative) decision in case k.16 A typical element C ∈ Cline can thus be identified
with a sequence 1C = (0...011...110...0) in which all 1’s are adjacent to each other (form an
interval) in the given left-to-right ordering. Let X lineK := {1C ; C ∈ Cline} ⊆ {0, 1}K . Given
the proposed identification of cases and issues, majoritarianism demands to determine
collective acceptability by letting individuals vote on each single case and to derive the
social standard via Condorcet admissibility in the space X lineK ; note that the issue-wise
majority view is in general not an admissible standard (i.e. not an element of X lineK ).
The following result characterizes Condorcet admissibility in the case of the horizontal
equity norm Cline. To state the result, observe that any non-empty subset J ⊆ [1...S] can be
uniquely written as the disjoint union of non-adjacent intervals J =
⊔N
n=1 In; accordingly,
any element x = 1J ∈ {0, 1}K can be written as 1F In with disjoint and non-adjacent
intervals I1, ..., IN .
Proposition 2.7 Consider µ ∈ ∆∗(X lineK ) such that Maj(µ) 6= 0, and write Maj(µ) =
1F In. Then x = 1J ∈ Cond (X lineK , µ) if and only if there exist n,m ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that J
is the smallest interval containing In and Im.
To illustrate, let ℓ, r ∈ [1...S] with ℓ+1 < r, and suppose that one third of the population
are strict leftists endorsing the standard [1...ℓ], one third are strict rightists endorsing the
standard [r...S], and the final third are strict liberalists endorsing the standard [1...S].
Then, Cond (µ) = {1[1...ℓ],1[r...S],1[1...S]}. This is easily verified by looking at the different
sequences in the sequential majority voting over single positions. Call [1...ℓ] the ‘left’
positions, [ℓ+ 1...r − 1] the ‘middle’ positions, and [r...S] the ‘right’ positions. If a left and
a middle position are already decided before the first right position is to be decided, then
the social standard [1...ℓ] results; if a right and a middle position are already decided before
the first left position is to be decided, then the social standard [r...S] results; finally, if a left
and a right position are already decided before the first middle position is to be decided,
then the social standard [1...S] results. Thus, depending on the particular sequence of
majority decisions, either the left dogma, the right dogma, or complete permissiveness
prevails. The acceptability of every position is therefore at the mercy of history (below,
we will call this phenomenon ‘issue-wise indeterminacy’). Note also that a profile µ is
Condorcet determinate if and only if Maj(µ) ∈ X lineK . ♦
The diachronic perspective of judgement aggregation lends itself very naturally to the
present interpretation in terms of horizontal equity standards. Anglo-Saxon law, to name
an important example, develops over time with previous court decisions restricting present
jurisdiction. Past court decisions thus represent an accumulated ‘standard’ that has to
be taken into account in present legal practice. In a similar way, also other institutions
may wish to submit to intertemporal consistency by referring to past decisions in recurring
16In view of the identification of the sets [1...S] and [1...K] one might wonder why we have distinguished
them in the first place. The reason is that, while natural, the simple identification of each case with an
issue in the judgement aggregation model yields only one possibility to model the underlying aggregation
problem; for instance, issues could also be identified with appropriate subsets of cases.
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cases; examples are the hiring policy of an academic department, or the admission process
for office at public institutions.
Frequently, but perhaps not always, the intersection of two admissible standards will
be admissible as a standard as well. Indeed, the eligibility under each of two different
standards can be seen as a standard by itself. Moreover, the set [1...S] itself can always be
considered to be a standard, namely the standard that represents maximal permissibility.
Formally, a convex structure, or a convexity on a finite set S is a collection C of subsets of
S such that C is closed under non-empty intersections and such that S ∈ C.17 The general
idea behind our proposal to model horizontal social equity as an aggregation problem is
as follows. As above, the set S consists of the possible cases, and the elements of C (the
‘convex’ sets) describe ‘similarity clusters’ of cases. The smallest similarity cluster common
to all elements of a given set J is called its convex hull, conv(J) :=
⋂ {C ∈ C ; J ⊆ C}.
The convex structure describes a ‘meta-standard’ by requiring that all legitimate standards,
individual as well as social, form similarity clusters. For instance, if in a legal context, the
cases s1, s2, ..., sk are counted, say, as negligence, then all cases belonging to the same
similarity cluster, i.e. all cases in conv({s1, s2, ..., sk}) must be counted as negligence as
well. The convex structure thus represents the ‘rule of law,’ i.e. the embodied equity norm
corresponding to a fundamental principle of non-arbitrariness.
In case of the left-to-right spectrum in Example 2.6 above, the similarity clusters are the
intervals, and legitimate yes-no classifications must respect the similarities derived from the
underlying linear neighborhood structure. Another convex structure that will frequently
be applicable is that of a ‘taxonomic hierarchy.’ A family of sets Ctax is called a taxonomic
hierarchy if, for all C,D ∈ Ctax, we have: either (1) C ⊂ D, or (2) D ⊂ C, or (3) C and D
are disjoint. The elements of Ctax are called taxa. A taxon C ∈ Ctax is minimal if C does
not contain any proper sub-taxa. Note that minimal taxa are not necessarily singletons.
Taxonomic hierarchies arise in many contexts. Consider, for instance, the problem of
determining which group of animals should be granted animal rights. A plausible horizontal
equity norm would be to require that this group, whatever it otherwise may be, must form
a biological taxon derived from the evolutionary tree of species. The meta-standard thus
allows for individual disagreement about the appropriate specific taxon, say whether it be
only the mammals or all vertebrates, but no disagreement about the fact that it must be
a taxon.
As another example, consider the problem of regulating different industries. Horizon-
tal equity requirements may be imposed on legislature here as anti-favoritism design: any
regulation must be imposed on a natural class of sectors, say based on an industry clas-
sification system. Again, individual judges may disagree about the specific sectors which
ought to be regulated, but any proposed regulation must apply equally to all members of a
‘similarity cluster.’ Suppose, for instance, that one third of the representatives of the reg-
ulation authority endorse regulation of all companies in the subsector #5221 (‘Depository
Credit Intermediation’), one third would like to see all companies in the disjoint subsector
17Convex structures have been studied in discrete mathematics (see, e.g. van de Vel (1993)) with the
additional assumption that the empty set is a convex set (an element of C). Note that any family of
sets that is closed under non-empty intersections can be made a proper convex structure in this sense by
including the empty set and the universal set.
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#5222 (‘Nondepository Credit Intermediation’) regulated, and another third think that the
entire industry #52 (‘Finance and Insurance’) should be regulated.18 Then, if a separate
vote is taken on the regulation of each company, the Condorcet admissible policies are to
regulate the subsector #5221, the subsector #5222, or their smallest common supersector
#522 (‘Credit Intermediation and Related Activities’).
An interesting and frequently applicable generalization of the taxonomic hierarchy
model arises by assuming that the admissible similarity clusters are the unions of at most
m taxa. For instance, in the context of regulation policy one might wish to treat companies
that share a common legal status similarly across different sectors. Avoiding favoritism
would still be guaranteed in this model but in a more flexible way. Note that the resulting
family of subsets forms a convexity if and only if m ≤ 2.
3 Unanimity preempted
Sequential majority voting, i.e. choosing from the Condorcet admissible set, can lead to
violations of unanimous consent in some issues. A simple (and well-known) example is the
following situation in the 4-permutahedron.
Example 3.1 Let three preference orderings ≻1,≻2,≻3 on {a, b, c, d} be given as follows:
d ≻1 a ≻1 b ≻1 c, b ≻2 c ≻2 d ≻2 a, c ≻3 d ≻3 a ≻3 b, and consider the anonymous profile
µ such that µ(≻1) = µ(≻2) = µ(≻3) = 13 . Let γ be any path that first decides the three
binary comparisons (a, b), (b, c), (c, d). Then, we obtain a
µ≻ b, b µ≻ c and c µ≻ d, each by a
(2/3) majority; thus, by transitivity, the ordering a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d is selected. In particular,
a ≻ d although there is unanimous agreement on the opposite ranking of a and d. Our
following analysis will show that such unanimity violations can occur as soon as there are
at least 4 alternatives. ♦
For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and k ∈ [1...K], we say that µ is unanimous in coordinate k if
µk(0) = 1 or µk(1) = 1. Let x ∈ X; we say that x violates µ-unanimity in coordinate k
if µk(xk) = 0. We say that Condorcet guarantees unanimity on X if, for all µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
there is no x ∈ Cond (X,µ) which violates µ-unanimity in any coordinate (equivalently:
diachronic judgement aggregation never violates unanimity on X). Recall that κ(X) is
the size of the largest critical fragment in X. This section’s main result is reminiscent of
Proposition 1.4.
Theorem 3.2 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K. Then Condorcet guarantees unanimity on X if and only
if κ(X) ≤ 3.
As the proof of Theorem 3.2 shows, the possible violations of respect for unanimity
when κ(X) > 3 require only three agents and can occur thus quite easily.
Example 3.3 (a) (Preference Aggregation) Let N ∈ N, and let XprN be as in §2.1. In the
Appendix we show that
κ(XprN ) = N.
18Numbers are taken from the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
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Thus, Condorcet guarantees unanimity on XprN if and only if N ≤ 3.
(b) (Restricted preference aggregation) Let  be a partial order on [1...N ], and let Xpr
be the set of all linear orders on [1...N ] which extend . Judgement aggregation over Xpr
describes a variant of Arrovian preference aggregation where the voters unanimously agree
with the preferences encoded in , and where the social preference order is also required
(e.g. by the constitution) to agree with the preferences encoded in . For instance,
suppose that all preferences are defined over the Cartesian product M ×B where M ⊆ R
represents a set of feasible amounts of public expenditure and B is a (finite) set of social
states. Moreover, assume that the partial order  expresses monotonicity with respect to
the first component in each social state (‘more money is better’) while refraining from any
judgement across states, i.e. (m, b) (m′, b′) :⇔ [b = b′ and m < m′].
A -antichain is a subset A ⊆ [1...N ] such that every pair of elements in A are -
incomparable. Let width() be the largest cardinality of any -antichain. For instance,
in the above example width() = |B|. In the Appendix we prove that
κ(Xpr

) = width(). (8)
Thus, Condorcet guarantees unanimity on Xpr if and only if width() ≤ 3. Equation (8)
also shows that in the example, one obtains a median space if and only if |B| = 2, i.e. if
there are only two different social states. In particular, in that case the majority view is
always feasible, i.e. is a linear order (that evidently agrees with the preferences encoded
in ). Condorcet guarantees unanimity, however, also if |B| = 3, i.e. if there are three
different social states.
(c) (Equivalence Relations) Let N ∈ N, let K := N(N − 1)/2, and identify [1...K] with
a subset of [1...N ] × [1...N ] containing exactly one of the pairs (n,m) or (m,n) for each
n 6= m ∈ [1...N ]. Thus, an element of {0, 1}K represents a symmetric, reflexive binary
relation (i.e. undirected graph) on [1...N ]. Let XeqN ⊂ {0, 1}K be the set of all equivalence
relations on [1...N ]. In the Appendix we show that
κ(XeqN ) = N.
Thus, Condorcet guarantees unanimity on XeqN if and only if N ≤ 3.
(d) (Committee Selection) Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and let XcomI,J,K be as defined in eqn.(4)
of §2.2. A fragment w is XcomI,J,K-critical if and only if either (a) |w| = J + 1 and w =
(1, 1, . . . , 1) or (b) |w| = K − I + 1 and w = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Thus,
κ(XcomI,J ;K) = 1 + max{J, K − I}.
For example, suppose K = 4 and J = I = 2; then κ(Xcom2,2;4) = 3, so Condorcet guarantees
unanimity on Xcom2,2;4. However, if K ≥ 5, then either J ≥ 3 or K − I ≥ 3, so that
κ(XcomI,J ;K) ≥ 4; then Condorcet does not guarantee unanimity on XcomI,J ;K .
(e) (Resource Allocation) Let D,M ∈ N, and let X∆M,D be as in eqn.(6) of §2.2. Suppose
M ≥ D2 (which is always true if we denominate money in small enough units). In the
Appendix we show that
κ(X∆M,D) = D.
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Thus Condorcet guarantees unanimity on X∆M,D if and only if D ≤ 3. ♦
The application of Theorem 3.2 to the horizontal equity model in §2.3 above requires
the computation of κ(XC) for any convex structure C. The following result provides an
explicit formula. Let [1...K] have the convex structure C; for simplicity, we assume in the
following that ∅ ∈ C. As above, let conv(J) = ⋂ {C ∈ C ; J ⊆ C}, and note that I ⊆ J
implies conv(I) ⊆ conv(J). Thus,⋃
I(J
conv(I) ⊆ conv(J). (9)
Say that J is Carathe´odory-independent if the set inclusion (9) is strict. The Carathe´odory
number of C is defined as
λ(C) := max{|J |; J ⊆ [1...K] is Carathe´odory-independent},
(van de Vel, 1993, §II.1.5, p.166).
Proposition 3.4 Let C be a convex structure on [1...K]. Then κ(XC) = λ(C) + 1.
For the linear convexity Cline consisting of all intervals on the (ordered) set [1...K], one
obtains λ(Cline) = 2. Thus, by Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.2 Condorcet guarantees
unanimity on the corresponding space XCline . Moreover, it is easily verified that, for any
taxonomic hierarchy Ctax on [1...K], there exists an ordering of the elements of [1...K] such
that all taxa are intervals with respect to that ordering. It thus follows that Condorcet
guarantees unanimity on the corresponding spaces Xtax.
3.1 On the possibility to design respect for unanimity
Theorem 3.2 above characterizes the aggregation problems for which respect for a unani-
mous vote is guaranteed no matter which sequence of majority decisions one chooses. As
it turns out, most aggregation problems cannot guarantee respect for unanimity in this
strong sense. In this subsection, we ask whether it is possible to overcome the problem
by design. In other words, for a given aggregation problem, do there exist paths of ma-
jority decisions that guarantee respect for unanimity for all profiles? One might expect a
negative answer since prima facie it is not clear how, by mere design of the sequence, one
could ‘detect’ unanimities in contrast to mere majorities (in a profile-independent way).
We consider two illustrative examples. The first pertains to the spaces X∆M,D and confirms
this negative intuition. The second example, on the other hand, shows that the problem
can in fact be overcome in the context of preference aggregation.
Proposition 3.5 Consider the spaces X∆M,D as defined in §2.2. If D ≥ 4, there does not
exist a path γ such that F γ(µ) respects unanimity for all profiles µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,D).
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Given this negative result for the spaces X∆M,D, the following positive result for prefer-
ence aggregation is all the more remarkable. Recall that the uncovered relation
µ≺uc of the
tournament
µ≺ is defined as follows (Moulin, 1988, p.254)
b
µ≺uc a :⇔
[
b
µ≺ a and for all c ∈ [1...N ] : c µ≺ b⇒ c µ≺ a
]
.
Proposition 3.6 Consider the space XprN of all linear orderings on [1...N ], and define a
path ζ on the set of all pairs (n,m) ∈ [1...N ] × [1...N ] lexicographically such that (n,m)
occurs before (n′,m′) in ζ if and only if [n < n′ or (n = n′ and m < m′)]. Then, for
any µ, F ζ(µ) extends the uncovered relation corresponding to Maj(µ). In particular, F ζ(µ)
respects unanimity for all µ.
The choice rule among alternatives induced by the path ζ defined in Proposition 3.6
admits the following simple recursive description. First step: let A1 := [1...N ] be the initial
pool of alternatives and set element n1 := 1 as the initial top alternative. Step ℓ: Compare
the current top alternative nℓ−1 to all alternatives m > nℓ−1 in the current pool Aℓ−1. If
nℓ−1 wins against all such elements, then nℓ−1 is the final choice; otherwise, let the new
top alternative nℓ be the smallest majority winner against nℓ−1 and take Aℓ as the old
pool minus the majority losers against nℓ−1. Evidently, this procedure yields a final choice
after a finite number of steps, which by Proposition 3.6 cannot be unanimously defeated
by another alternative.
It turns out that the choice rule induced by F ζ(µ) is the same as the one induced by
the multi-stage elimination tree procedure of Shepsle and Weingast (1984) (cf. Section 9.4
in Moulin (1988)). In contrast to the multi-stage elimination tree which only produces a
winning alternative, however, F ζ yields an entire ordering over all alternatives. Moreover,
to accomplish this, F ζ only needs N(N−1)
2
binary comparisons, whereas the multi-stage
elimination tree involves (2N−1)− 1 binary comparisons. In particular, in the multi-stage
elimination procedure, an alternative may face the same opponent several times; this does
not happen along the path ζ.
4 Issue-wise indeterminacy
If the Condorcet set is not a singleton, how large can it be? The size of the Condorcet
set matters under each of the motivations: How determinate is majoritarianism by itself
as a normative criterion? How much leeway is there for path-dependence to matter? How
much room is there for a strategic agenda-setter to manipulate the outcome by the choice
of a suitable path?
We will address the question of the size of the Condorcet set in the following three
sections based on different definitions of ‘size.’ In the present section, we take the Con-
dorcet set at a profile to be ‘large’ if it admits elements containing both truth-values in
every coordinate. Such profiles will be called ‘issue-wise indeterminate,’ and aggregation
problems for which such profiles exist will likewise be called ‘issue-wise indeterminate.’
While exploring the mere existence of issue-wise indeterminate profiles may look like
a worst case analysis, we also show that, frequently, such profiles are rather easy to come
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by. The characterization of issue-wise indeterminacy in this section can be viewed as a
counterpart in judgement aggregation to the classical results by McKelvey (1979) on the
indeterminacy of preference-based majority voting.
4.1 General characterization
Let X ⊂ {0, 1}K . For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), we define the set of indeterminate issues for µ:
Indet(µ) := {k ∈ [1...K] ; ∃ x,y ∈ Cond (X,µ) such that xk 6= yk}.
Thus, Indet(µ) is the set of issues in which either answer is compatible with the principle
of majoritarianism as embodied in the notion of Condorcet admissibility. Diachronically
speaking, Indet(µ) = {k ∈ [1...K]; there exist paths γ and ζ such that F γk (µ) 6= F ζk (µ)}
(by Proposition 1.3). We say that µ is issue-wise indeterminate if Indet(µ) = [1...K].
Example 4.1 (a) (Preference aggregation) Let XprN be as defined in §2.1, and consider
µ ∈ ∆(XprN ). By Proposition 2.1 (b) we know that the ‘determinate issues’ (n,m) are
exactly those for which either n
µ≺∗ m or m
µ≺∗ n, in other words,
Indet(µ) = {(n,m) ∈ [1...N ]× [1...N ] ; n µ≈∗ m}.
Note that it is easy to construct profiles such that all alternatives belong to the same cycle.
For instance, the profile µ that assigns weight 1/N to the preference order (n ≺ n + 1 ≺
· · · ≺ N ≺ 1 ≺ · · · ≺ n− 1) for each n ∈ [1...N ] is issue-wise indeterminate.
(b) (Linear Convexity) Consider the linear convexity Cline on [1...K] defined in §2.3, and
suppose that, for some profile µ, we have Maj(µ) = 1F In with disjoint and non-adjacent
intervals I1, ..., IN . For each n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let In = [k−n ...k+n ] with k−1 ≤ k+1 < k−2 ≤ k+2 <
... < k−N ≤ k+N . If N = 1, all issues are determinate, otherwise only the issues k < k−1
and k > k+l (if existent) are determinate. Thus, it is again easy to construct issue-wise
indeterminate profiles. ♦
The key to the analysis of this section is the following result. Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), and let
w be a critical fragment for X, with supp (w) = J . We say µ activates w if MajJ(µ) = w.
Let W (X,µ) be the set of X-critical fragments activated by µ.
Theorem 4.2 For all X ⊆ {0, 1}K, and µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), Indet(µ) =
⋃
w∈W (X,µ)
supp (w).
Theorem 4.2 states that issue k is indeterminate given µ whenever there exists a critical
fragment activated by µ that fixes the answer in issue k; in particular, µ is issue-wise
indeterminate if for each issue k ∈ [1...K] such a critical fragment exists. In the preference
aggregation example, any cycle of Maj(µ) corresponds to a critical fragment activated by
µ.
Evidently, Theorem 4.2 entails a characterization of when no issue is indeterminate,
i.e. of when issue-wise majority voting is consistent for a given profile, and thus of Condorcet
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determinacy. This question has been addressed before by Dietrich and List (2010) and
Pivato (2009). By Theorem 4.2, Indet(µ) = ∅ if and only if W (X,µ) = ∅, i.e. if and only
if µ does not activate any critical fragment in X. This readily translates into Dietrich
and List’s (2010) condition of ‘majority consistency.’ Dietrich and List (2010) also provide
a number of other, simpler but only sufficient conditions for Condorcet determinacy of a
given profile, among them the counterpart in the general judgement aggregation model of
Sen’s classical condition of ‘value restriction’ (see Sen (1970)). Pivato (2009) provides a
class of sufficient geometric conditions for determinacy of a profile.
We say that X is issue-wise indeterminate if there exists some issue-wise indeterminate
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X). Let W3(X) be the set of critical fragments for X of order 3 or more. For any
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), we have W (X,µ) ⊆ W3(X), because a critical fragment of order two cannot
be activated by µ. Let x ∈ {0, 1}K ; we say that x is critical for X if there exists a collection
{w1, . . . ,wN} ⊆ W3(X) such that wn ⊑ x for all n ∈ [1...N ] and [1...K] =
⋃N
n=1 supp (wn).
Let Crit(X) := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; x is critical for X}. Let Maj(X) := {Maj(µ) ; µ ∈ ∆∗ (X)}.
The following result is the central result of the paper, as it provides a simple combina-
torial characterization of issue-wise indeterminacy. A profile is issue-wise indeterminate if
and only if the majority ideal point at this profile is critical for X. Thus, an aggregation
space is issue-wise indeterminate if and only if it gives rise to a majority ideal point that
is critical for X.
Theorem 4.3 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K .
(a) For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
(
µ is issue-wise indeterminate
)
⇐⇒
(
Maj(µ) ∈ Crit(X)
)
.
(b)
(
X is issue-wise indeterminate
)
⇐⇒
(
Maj(X) ∩ Crit(X) 6= ∅
)
.
Proof: (a) follows immediately from Theorem 4.2, and (b) follows from (a). 2
To apply Theorem 4.3(a) to a profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), we need to determine whether Maj(µ) ∈
Crit(X). The following result provides an answer for the aggregation of preference order-
ings and equivalence relations, respectively; in either application, issue-wise indeterminacy
arises very easily. In preference aggregation, this is a well-studied problem, see McKelvey
(1979).
Proposition 4.4 Let N ∈ N, let K := N(N − 1), and bijectively identify [1...K] with
a subset of [1...N ] × [1...N ] containing exactly one of the pairs (n,m) or (m,n) for each
n 6= m ∈ [1...N ].
(a) (Preference aggregation) Let x ∈ {0, 1}K , and interpret x as tournament on
[1...N ], as in §2.1. Then x ∈ Crit(XprN ) if and only if topcycle(x) contains every
element of [1...N ].
(b) (Equivalence relations) Let x ∈ {0, 1}K , and interpret x as an undirected graph
on [1...N ], as in Example 3.3(c). Then x ∈ Crit(XeqN ) if and only if the x-graph is
connected, but not complete.19
19Recall that a graph is complete if every vertex is adjacent to every other vertex.
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4.2 Issue-wise indeterminacy in McGarvey spaces
The characterization of issue-wise indeterminacy becomes particularly simple in spaces
in which the set of majoritarian ideal points is completely unrestricted, i.e. in which
Maj(X) = {0, 1}K . In this case, we say that X is McGarvey. The McGarvey property
is analyzed in detail in Nehring and Pivato (2011a), where numerous examples are given.
Theorem 4.3 has the following simple corollary.
Corollary 4.5 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K be McGarvey. Then
(
X is issue-wise indeterminate
)
⇐⇒(
Crit(X) 6= ∅
)
.
Example 4.6 (a) (Preference Aggregation) XprN is McGarvey (McGarvey, 1953); thus, if
N ≥ 3, then Proposition 4.4(a) implies that XprN is issue-wise indeterminate (as we already
saw in Example 4.1(a)).
(b) (Equivalence Relations) XeqN is McGarvey (Nehring and Pivato, 2011a, Example 3.9(a)).
Thus, if N ≥ 3, then Proposition 4.4(b) implies that XeqN is issue-wise indeterminate. ♦
The following result provides a simple and frequently applicable sufficient condition for
issue-wise indeterminacy in the horizontal equity model of §2.3.20
Proposition 4.7 Let C be a convex structure on [1...K], and let XC be defined as in §2.3.
Then, XC is McGarvey if and only if C contains all singletons. In this case, XC is issue-wise
indeterminate.
The above results establish a strong connection between the McGarvey property and
issue-wise indeterminacy. Indeed, we do not know of a single, ‘naturally occurring’ ag-
gregation problem that is McGarvey but fails to be issue-wise indeterminate. One might
thus conjecture that any non-degenerate McGarvey problem X possesses an element that
is critical for X, and is hence issue-wise indeterminate. Yet the following example proves
this to be wrong.
Example 4.8 Let X be the subset of {0, 1}5 defined by the two critical fragments w1 =
(1, 1, 0, 0, ∗) and w2 = (∗, 0, 0, 1, 1).21 By construction, we have Crit(X) = ∅ (since w1 and
w2 disagree in the second and fourth coordinate). Moreover, X has 28 elements which
is more than 3/4 of 32 = |{0, 1}5|; hence, by Proposition 2.4(a) of Nehring and Pivato
(2011a) X is McGarvey. By Corollary 4.5, X is not issue-wise indeterminate. Note also
that X contains 1k for all k; this shows that the property of closedness under non-empty
intersections cannot be dropped in Proposition 4.7 above. ♦
20We are again assuming ∅ ∈ C; note that if ∅ 6∈ C then XC is indeterminate in a trivial way.
21Here, the “∗” notation means that supp (w1) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and supp (w2) = {2, 3, 4, 5}; see Notation
A.2.
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4.3 Aggregation problems that are not issue-wise indeterminate
Beyond the class of median spaces, are there any natural aggregation spaces that are not
issue-wise indeterminate? These seems to be rare: at this point, we have found one such
class of spaces in which issue-wise indeterminacy fails robustly. These are the ‘comprehen-
sive’ spaces that are characterized by the requirement that any view affirming a larger set
of propositions than some feasible view be feasible as well. For instance, in the context
of the committee selection problem, a comprehensive aggregation problem is obtained if
any super-committee of a feasible committee is feasible. Formally, for any x,y ∈ {0, 1}K ,
write x ≤ y if xk ≤ yk for all k ∈ [1...K]. A subset X ⊂ {0, 1}K is comprehensive if, for
any x,y ∈ {0, 1}K , if x ∈ X and x ≤ y, then y ∈ {0, 1}K also. For example, XcomI,K;K is
comprehensive, for any I ≤ K.
We say X is nondegenerate if, for every k ∈ [1...K], there is some w ∈ W3(X) with
k ∈ supp (w). (For example, XcomK−1,K;K is degenerate: all critical fragments have order 2).
If X is degenerate, then Crit(X) is obviously empty. Thus, nondegeneracy is necessary for
issue-wise indeterminacy.
Proposition 4.9 If X is comprehensive and nondegenerate, then Crit(X) = {0}. Thus,
X is issue-wise indeterminate if and only if 0 ∈ Maj(X).
To illustrate, consider the class of comprehensive committee selection problems XcomI,K;K .
Here, Proposition 4.9 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.10 Let I > 0. The space XcomI,K;K is issue-wise indeterminate if and only if
I < K/2.
To verify this, simply observe that 0 ∈ Maj(XcomI,K;K) only if I < K/2; indeed, if ever
voter approves of more than half of the candidates, then at least one candidate must receive
a majority of votes.
Comprehensiveness of the committees selection problem is essential for the conclusion of
Corollary 4.10. Otherwise, issue-wise indeterminacy obtains almost without exception, as
shown by the following result; note that XcomI,J ;K is comprehensive if J = K, and isomorphic
to a comprehensive problem if I = 0.
Proposition 4.11 Consider XcomI,J ;K , and suppose that I > 0 and J < K. Then X
com
I,J ;K is
issue-wise indeterminate unless I = J = K/2.
4.4 How ‘likely’ is issue-wise indeterminacy?
Issue-wise indeterminacy characterizes full path-dependence in terms of the existence of a
profile such that, in each issue, both answers are possible via a suitably chosen decision
path. One may doubt the relevance of this concept and the corresponding analysis, since
existence results might only describe ‘worst cases’ that are very special and unlikely to
happen. One may thus wish to complement this by an analysis of how ‘likely’ it is to
run into such a profile. Note that in the case of the aggregation of preference orderings
and equivalence relations, respectively, Proposition 4.4 already suggests that issue-wise
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indeterminacy is far from being special and unlikely in the sense that it is obtained for
a large set of profiles. In the following attempt at a more general analysis, we take the
complexity of a profile as a proxy for its ‘likelihood,’ and assess the complexity of a profile
in terms of a very simple but instructive measure, the number of agents needed to construct
it.
Formally, for any N ∈ N, let
∆∗N (X) :=
{
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) ; ∀ x ∈ X, µ(x) = n
N
for some n ∈ [0 . . . N ]
}
.
Politically, ∆∗N (X) is the set of profiles which can be generated by a population of exactly
N voters. Geometrically, ∆∗N (X) can be visualized as a discrete ‘mesh’ of density 1/N
embedded in ∆∗ (X). Let ∆∗ind (X) := {µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) ; µ is issue-wise indeterminate}. We
define
η(X) := min {N ∈ N ; ∆∗N (X) ∩∆∗ind (X) 6= ∅}.
(with η(X) = ∞ if X is not issue-wise indeterminate). Politically, η(X) is the minimum
number of voters needed to construct an issue-wise indeterminate profile. Geometrically,
η(X) measures the thickness of ∆∗ind (X): if η(X) > N , then ∆
∗
ind (X) cannot contain a
sphere of radius greater than ǫ
N
, where ǫ :=
√
1− 1
K
. Thus, η(X) measures the suscepti-
bility of X to issue-wise indeterminacy: if η(X) is small, then X is very susceptible.
Evidently, for any X ⊆ {0, 1}K , we have η(X) ≥ 3. The following result shows that
several common aggregation problems are very susceptible to issue-wise indeterminacy,
since one obtains the minimal value η(X) = 3 for them.
Proposition 4.12 (a) If X has a critical fragment of order K, then η(X) = 3.
(b) Let XprN be as in §2.1. If N ≥ 3, then η(XprN ) = 3.
(c) Let XeqN be as in Example 3.3(c). If N ≥ 3, then η(XeqN ) = 3.
(d) Let X∆M,D be as in eqn.(6) of §2.2. If D ≥ 3, then η(X∆M,D) = 3.
While for many aggregation problems, issue-wise indeterminate profiles are thus ‘easy’
to construct, the spaces XcomI,J ;K (defined in §2.2 above) exhibit a more complex pattern.
Consider, for instance, the space Xcom4,6;10, i.e. the space of all committees that contain at
least 4 and at most 6 members of a set of 10 candidates. In the appendix, we show
that the profiles µ that induce issue-wise indeterminacy must have either Maj(µ) = 0 or
Maj(µ) = 1. Without loss of generality, by symmetry, suppose the former, i.e. µk(1) <
1
2
for all k ∈ [1 . . . K]. Since each feasible view endorses at least 4 candidates, we have∑
k µk(1) ≥ 4. Denoting by k∗ the candidate with maximal popular support, we thus
obtain 4
10
≤ µk∗(1) < 12 . Satisfaction of this inequality requires at least five agents; together
with Proposition 4.13(b) below we thus obtain η(Xcom4,6;10) = 5.
The argument just given can be generalized to give the lower bound on η(XcomI,J ;K) in
part (a) of the following result.
Proposition 4.13 Consider the spaces XcomI,J ;K as in eqn.(4) of §2.2.
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(a) Suppose that 0 < I < J < K; then
η(XcomI,J ;K) ≥ min
{
K
K − 2I ,
K
2J −K
}
. (10)
(b) For any 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, we have η(XcomI,J ;K) ≤ K. Moreover, one obtains the
following upper bounds for η(XcomI,J ;K).
[i] If 0 < I < K/2, then let N :=
⌈
I
K − 2I
⌉
. Then η(XcomI,J ;K) ≤ 2N + 1.
[ii] If K/2 < J , then let N :=
⌈
K − J
2J −K
⌉
. Then η(XcomI,J ;K) ≤ 2N + 1.
Combining parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 4.13, we obtain η(Xcom4,6;10) = 5, as noted
above; similarly, one obtains, for example, η(Xcom6,8;14) = 7 and η(X
com
5,6;11) = 11.
5 Total indeterminacy
Issue-wise indeterminacy means that, for some profile, any answer can be obtained in each
issue by choosing a suitable decision path. An even stronger form of indeterminacy, which
we shall henceforth refer to as total indeterminacy, occurs if, for some profile, any logically
possible combination of answers across issues can be obtained via an appropriate decision
path, i.e. if the corresponding Condorcet set contains all possible views.
Formally, a profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is totally indeterminate if Cond (X,µ) = X. We say that
X is totally indeterminate if there exists some µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) which is totally indeterminate
over X.
Example 5.1 (a) Fix J ∈ (K
2
...K], and let XcomJ,J ;K :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K ; ‖x‖ = J}. (Thus,
XcomJ,J ;K is the set of all ‘committees’ comprised of exactly J out of K candidates.) Let µ
be the uniform distribution on XcomJ,J ;K . Then Cond
(
XcomJ,J ;K , µ
)
= XcomJ,J ;K , hence µ is totally
indeterminate.
(Formally, this follows from Proposition 2.3(c). Intuitively, it is straightforward: if there
are exactly J open slots and K viable candidates, and the slots are allocated on a ‘first
come, first serve’ basis, then the slots will simply be allocated to the first J candidates.)
(b) Let D ≥ 3, let M ∈ N, and let X∆M,D be as in eqn.(6) of §2.2. For all d ∈ [1...D], let xd
be the element of X∆M,D which allocates all M dollars towards claimant d. (Thus, for all
m ∈ [1...M ], we have xdd,m = 1, while xdc,m = 0 for all c ∈ [1...D] \ {d}.) Let µ ∈ ∆∗
(
X∆M,D
)
be the profile which allocates weight 1/D to each of x1, . . . ,xD. Then Maj(µ) = 0, so
Proposition 2.4 implies that Cond
(
X∆M,D, µ
)
= X∆M,D, hence µ is totally indeterminate. In
fact, it follows from Proposition 2.4 that µ is totally indeterminate only if Maj(µ) = 0,
i.e. if medd(µ) = 0 for all d ∈ [1...D]. Moreover, it also easily verified that µ is issue-wise
indeterminate only if Maj(µ) = 0, thus a profile is issue-wise indeterminate if and only if
it is totally indeterminate.
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(The profile that allocates weight 1/D to each of x1, . . . ,xD is not as contrived as it
may seem. When the government engages in wealth redistribution, the elements of [1...G]
represent the potential recipients of government largesse (e.g. state governments seeking
federal assistance; economic sectors seeking subsidies, etc.). If the redistribution is decided
by a committee (e.g. the Senate), and each potential recipient controls roughly the same
number of committee members (e.g. each state has two senators), then the resulting profile
closely resembles this totally indeterminate profile). ♦
For any x ∈ X and z ∈ {0, 1}K , recall that x ≍ z if there is no y ∈ X \ {x} which is
between x and z (i.e. such that, for all k ∈ [1...K] and c ∈ {0, 1}, (xk = c = zk) =⇒ (yk =
c)). We say that z ∈ {0, 1}K is a panopticon for X if x ≍ z for all x ∈ X (this implies that
z 6∈ X, because any element of X would be between itself and every other element of X).
Heuristically, from a panopticon, one can ‘see’ each element of X without the view being
blocked by any other elements. For example, 1 is a panopticon for XcomJ,J ;K . Let Pan(X) be
the set of all panoptica for X. The following result is this section’s key observation:
Proposition 5.2 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K .
(a) For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X),
(
µ is totally indeterminate
)
⇐⇒
(
Maj(µ) ∈ Pan(X)
)
.
(b)
(
X is totally indeterminate
)
⇐⇒
(
Maj(X) ∩ Pan(X) 6= ∅
)
.
Proof: (a) follows immediately from Lemma 1.1(b), and (b) follows from (a). 2
Note that Pan(X) 6= ∅ requires that all x,y ∈ X have a Hamming distance ≥ 2.
This is in itself a strong restriction; for instance, it precludes the permutahedron from
having a panopticon, and hence from being totally indeterminate. Above, we have seen
that the ‘allocation’ problems on XcomJ,J ;K and X
∆
M,D are totally indeterminate. Are there
other natural classes of aggregation problems that are totally indeterminate? A necessary
condition is that Pan(X) 6= ∅. As in §4, it is natural to look at McGarvey problems,
because for these Pan(X) 6= ∅ is also sufficient for total indeterminacy. However, it is not
clear that such problems exist. Heuristically, the problem is that, to have a panopticon,
X must be a relatively ‘small’ subset of {0, 1}K , whereas to be McGarvey, X must be
relatively ‘large’. The next proposition illustrates this conflict.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose X contains 1 and 1k, for all k ∈ [1...K]. Then, X is McGarvey
but Pan(X) = ∅.
Propositions 4.7, 5.2(b) and 5.3 together show that many naturally occurring aggrega-
tion problems are issue-wise indeterminate but not totally indeterminate. On the other
hand, we will see in the next section that aggregation problems will frequently be ‘almost’
totally indeterminate.
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6 Pushing the limits: Condorcet entropy and almost
total indeterminacy
In this section, we propose a way to measure the relative size of the Condorcet set. As
in other combinatorial contexts, it will be convenient to measure ‘size’ logarithmically.
Specifically, for µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) let
h(µ) :=
log2 |Cond (X,µ) |
log2 |X|
,
which we shall refer to as the Condorcet entropy of the profile µ.22 Note that if h(µ) ≈ 1,
then the profile µ is ‘almost’ totally indeterminate. For any y ∈ {0, 1}K , let X(y) :=
{x ∈ X ; x ≍ y}. If y = Maj(µ), then Lemma 1.1(b) says X(y) = Cond (X,µ). Thus, we
can define the Condorcet entropy of X:
h(X) := sup
µ∈∆∗(X)
h(µ) = max
y∈Maj(X)
log2 |X(y)|
log2 |X|
.
The Condorcet entropy thus measures how close X is to being totally indeterminate. In
particular, h(X) = 1 if and only if X is totally indeterminate. An important advantage
of using the logarithmic entropy measure is that the Condorcet entropy of a Cartesian
product is an average of the Condorcet entropies of its factors, and is thus independent of
the number of factors.23
To illustrate, consider the linear convexity C lineK consisting of all intervals on the or-
dered set on [1...K], and the corresponding space X lineK (cf. §2.3). If y∗ = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...) ∈
{0, 1}K , then X(y∗) contains all elements of X lineK that have exactly one array of an odd
number of consecutive 1’s starting at an odd numbered position in the set [1...K]. Evi-
dently, 1/4 of the elements of X lineK have this form if K is even, and slightly more if K odd.
Moreover, |X lineK | = K(K − 1)/2, so it takes roughly 2 bits less to encode the Condorcet
set than the entire set X lineK , out of log2[K(K − 1)/2]. We thus obtain
h(X lineK ) ≈ 1−
2
log2[K(K − 1)/2]
≈ 1− 2
2 log2(K)− 1
−−−−
K→∞
→ 1.
This shows that h(X lineK ) converges to 1 as K grows, i.e. X
line
K is ‘asymptotically’ totally
indeterminate. Formally, we say that a sequence {Xn}∞n=1 of aggregation problems is
asymptotically totally indeterminate if lim
n→∞
h(Xn) = 1.
Another natural example of a convexity is the hypercube convexity C2D on {0, 1}D which
consists of all subcubes of {0, 1}D. Formally, a set C ⊆ {0, 1}D belongs to C2D if and only if
22For any Y ⊂ {0, 1}K , the ratio (log2 |Y |)/K can be interpreted as the information content of Y relative
to the potential information content available in {0, 1}K ; this is often referred to as the entropy of Y (Cover
and Thomas, 1991). Our notion of Condorcet entropy can thus be viewed as measuring the information
content of Cond (X,µ) as a fraction of the information content of X.
23For instance, without the logarithmic transformation the Condorcet entropy of the n-fold Cartesian
product of any space that is not totally indeterminate would tend to 0 as n grows.
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C = {0, 1}D1 ×{0}D2 ×{1}D3 for some partition {D1, D2, D3} of D. Let X2D := {1C ; C ∈
C2D} (so that X2D ⊆ {0, 1}K with K = 2D).
The following result states that besides the spaces X lineK also the spaces C2D, the aggrega-
tion of preference orderings and the aggregation of equivalence relations are asymptotically
totally indeterminate as the number of alternatives grows without bound.
Proposition 6.1 (a) The sequence {XprN}∞N=1 is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
(b) The sequence {XeqN }∞N=1 is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
(c) The sequence {X lineK }∞K=1 is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
(d) The sequence {X2D}∞D=1 is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
Remark. In Proposition 6.1(a,b,c), we only establish 1 − h(XN) ≤ O
(
1
log2(N)
)
, so the
convergence may be slow. By contrast, the convergence in 6.1(d) is in fact very rapid with
1− h(X2D) ≤ O
(
1
D
)
.
Conclusion
The Condorcet set includes all minimally acceptable compromises between majoritarianism
and logical consistency; arguably, it thus contains the output of a large class of judgement
aggregation rules. It also provides a compact description of the possible outcomes of
diachronic judgement aggregation: the way in which real social decisions often emerge
from an uncoordinated sequence of ad hoc judgements unfolding over time. Unfortunately,
the Condorcet set is quite large for almost any nontrivial judgement aggregation problem.
In many plausible scenarios, path-dependence can override unanimous consensus on some
propositions; in others, it can manipulate the truth value of every proposition. In some
cases, any logically consistent outcome can arise from a suitably chosen path. In short:
history matters.
Several problems remain open. For example, let P be the set of all paths on [1...K]. For
any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), diachronic judgement aggregation via simple majority defines a function
F : P−→X. Let ν be the uniform probability distribution on P ; what is the distribution
of F ◦ ν? If F ◦ ν is almost-uniformly distributed on X, this represents an especially acute
form of total indeterminacy. On the other hand, if F ◦ ν is mostly concentrated on one or
a few views, then this perhaps recommends these views as superior social choices. Also:
what proportion of P violates unanimity?
We have assumed a diachronic process based on simple majority vote, because majority
vote is the unique binary voting rule which is decisive, neutral, and anonymous (May,
1952). However, we could obtain greater path-independence by sacrificing decisiveness
(e.g. using supermajoritarian voting in some coordinates), anonymity (e.g. using weighted
voting rules) or both (e.g. using a system with vetoes or oligarchies). In particular, if
we use a system of voting rules satisfying the intersection property, then the outcome is
guaranteed to be logically consistent, and hence, path-independent (Nehring and Puppe,
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2007, Proposition 3.4). For example, for all k ∈ [1...K], let Nk be the order of the largest
critical fragment containing k, and let qk := max{12 , 1− 1Nk }. Suppose we decide the truth
value of k via qk-supermajoritarian voting for each k ∈ [1...K]; then the outcome will be
path-independent (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Fact 3.4).
Is there an optimal tradeoff between decisiveness, neutrality, anonymity, and path-
independence? One possibility: simple majorities could make ‘provisional’ rulings on the
truth of certain propositions, but these rulings would only be treated as ‘precedents’ (i.e.
binding on later decisions) if they exceeded some supermajority threshold —otherwise they
could be overturned by a later, larger supermajority.
Finally, from the normative point of view, the indeterminacy of the Condorcet set
poses the questions what further considerations can be invoked to pin down the view of
the majority, and what rules these give rise to. In Section 1.2, we have briefly introduced
the class of weighted support rules. Are there are other, well-motivated classes of rules
that always select from the Condorcet set?
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1 (a) is immediate from the definition of Condorcet admissibility,
as is the first part of (b). Now suppose Maj(µ) 6∈ X; it remains only to show that
|Cond (X,µ) | ≥ 3. To see this, note that Maj(µ) 6∈ X only if there is some X-critical
fragment w which is activated by µ. This fragment w must have order 3 or more
(if |w| = 2, then w could not be activated by µ: if each coordinate received majority
support, then a nonzero proportion of voters would endorse both coordinates of w, which
is impossible because w is forbidden).
Now, fix some coordinate j ∈ supp (w), and let wj be the fragment obtained by deleting
coordinate j from w. Let Xj := {x ∈ X ; wj < x}; then Xj is nonempty, because wj is
not forbidden, because x is critical. Let x be an element of Xj such that there exists no
y ∈ Xj with M(x, µ) (M(y, µ).
Claim 1: x ∈ Cond (X,µ).
Proof: Suppose there was some y ∈ X with M(x, µ) ( M(y, µ). Then we must have
y 6∈ Xj, which means yj = wj. But supp (w) \ {j} ⊆ M(x, µ) ⊂ M(y, µ), so wj < y.
Thus, w < y. But w is forbidden, so this is impossible for any y ∈ X. 3 Claim 1
Thus, we can obtain an element of Cond (X,µ) by contradicting the majority will in any
single coordinate of w; thus, there are at least as many different elements of Cond (X,µ)
as there are coordinates in w —hence |Cond (X,µ) | ≥ |w| ≥ 3. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.2 To show that any weighted support rule Fφ,λ is Condorcet ad-
missible, take two views x and y such that x agrees with the majority view on a strictly
larger set of issues than y; say x agrees with Maj(µ) on Kx ⊆ [1...K], and y agrees with
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Maj(µ) on Ky ⊆ [1...K], with Kx % Ky. If k ∈ Ky, or if k 6∈ Kx, then µk(xk) = µk(yk);
on the other hand, if k ∈ Kx \Ky, then
µk(xk)− 12 > 0 > µk(yk)− 12 ,
hence φ[µk(xk) − 12 ] > φ[µk(yk) − 12 ] by our assumptions on φ. This shows that y does
not maximize the sum on the right hand side of (2), and hence that y is not chosen by
Fφ,λ.
Conversely, let a gain function φ and a view x ∈ Cond (X,µ) be given. Suppose that x
agrees with the majority view in the set Kx ⊆ [1...K] of issues, and let m := |Kx| (note
that m > 0). If m = K, then x agrees with the majority view in all issues and is the
unique Condorcet admissible view by Lemma 1.1. Thus, assume that m < K. For ε > 0,
define λk(ε) =
1
m
− ε if k ∈ Kx and λk(ε) = mεK−m if k 6∈ Kx. If ε is sufficiently small,
we obtain 0 < λk(ε) < 1 for all k. Moreover, for sufficiently small ε the view x is the
unique maximizer of the right hand side of (2). Indeed, any other view y ∈ Cond (X,µ)
disagrees with the majority view in least one issue k ∈ Kx. Since, for all k 6∈ Kx, λk(ε)
tends to zero, and φ[µk(xk)− 12 ] > 0 for all k ∈ Kx, this shows that y is not chosen by
Fφ,λ(ε) for sufficiently small ε. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Let z := Maj(µ).
(a) Let γ be a path through [1...K], and let x := F γ(µ). We must show that x ∈
Cond (X,µ). Let y ∈ X, and suppose y is between x and z.
Claim 1: For all t ∈ [1...K], we have xγ(t) = yγ(t).
Proof: (by induction on t) First, xγ(1) = zγ(1) (by definition of F
γ). Thus, yγ(1) = xγ(1)
also (because y is between x and z).
Now, let J := {γ(1), . . . , γ(t − 1)}, and suppose inductively that xJ = yJ ; we will
show that xγ(t) = yγ(t). If xγ(t) = zγ(t), then yγ(t) = xγ(t) (because y is between x and
z). If xγ(t) 6= zγ(t), then this must be because zγ(t) is X-inconsistent with xJ . But then
zγ(t) is also X-inconsistent with yJ (by induction), so we must also have yγ(t) 6= zγ(t)
(because y ∈ X). Thus, yγ(t) = xγ(t). 3 Claim 1
Thus, if y is between z and x, then Claim 1 implies that y is x. Thus, x ≍ z; hence
x ∈ Cond (X,µ), as desired.
(b) Let x ∈ Cond (X,µ); we must find a path γ such that F γ(µ) = x. Let J := |M(x, µ)|,
and let γ : [1...K]−→[1...K] be a path such that γ[1 . . . J ] =M(x, µ). Thus, xγ(j) = zγ(j)
for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ], while xγ(j) 6= zγ(j) for all j ∈ [J + 1 . . . K]. Let y := F γ(µ).
Claim 2: For all t ∈ [1...J ], yγ(t) = xγ(t).
Proof: (by induction on t) First, yγ(1) = zγ(1) by definition of F
γ; hence yγ(1) = xγ(1).
Let t ∈ [1...J ], let I := {γ(1), . . . , γ(t − 1)} and suppose inductively that yI = xI .
Now, xγ(t) is X-consistent with xI (because x ∈ X); hence zγ(t) is X-consistent with
yI (because yI = xI by induction hypothesis, while zγ(t) = xγ(t) by definition of γ and
J). Thus, yγ(t) = zγ(t); hence yγ(t) = xγ(t). 3 Claim 2
30
Claims 2 implies yJ = xJ ; hence y is between x and z (by definition of J). But y ∈ X
and x ≍ z; thus we must have y = x —in other words, F γ(µ) = x, as desired. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. (a) We will give two proofs —one based directly on Condorcet
admissibility, and one based on a ‘diachronic’ construction, via Proposition 1.3.
Direct proof of (a) “⊆” (by contrapositive) Let x ∈ XprN represent the ordering (a1
x≺
a2
x≺ a3
x≺ · · · x≺ aN), and suppose
x≺ is not a Hamiltonian chain in µ≺. Then there exists
n ∈ [1...N) such that an
µ≻ an+1. Define the ordering
y≺ by switching the positions of an
and an+1 in
x≺. That is:
a1
y≺ a2
y≺ · · · y≺ an−2
y≺ an−1
y≺ an+1
y≺ an
y≺ an+2
y≺ an+3
y≺ · · · y≺ aN .
Observe that
y≺ agrees with x≺ in every pairwise ordering except the ordering of {an, an+1}.
Thus, M(y, µ) = M(x, µ) ∪ {(an ≺ an+1)}. Thus, M(x, µ) is not maximal, so x 6∈
Cond (XprN , µ).
“⊇” Let (a1
µ≺ a2
µ≺ · · · µ≺ aN) be any Hamiltonian chain in
µ≺. Let x ∈ XprN be
the transitive closure of this Hamiltonian chain (so that a1
x≺ a2
x≺ · · · x≺ aN). Then
M(x, µ) ⊇ {(a1 ≺ a2), (a2 ≺ a3), . . ., (aN−1 ≺ aN)}. Furthermore, for any y ∈ XprN , if
M(y, µ) ⊇ {(a1 ≺ a2), (a2 ≺ a3), . . ., (aN−1 ≺ aN)}, then clearly y = x. Thus, M(x, µ)
is maximal, so x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ).
Diachronic proof of (a) “⊆” Let γ : [1...K]−→[1...K] be a path, and let x = F γ(µ); we
must show that x is a Hamiltonian chain in Maj(µ). To see this, let n1, n2 ∈ [1...N ] be
any nearest neighbours in the ordering
x≺; then the ordering between n1 and n2 must
have been decided directly through majority vote, not indirectly through transitivity
constraints (because a transitivity constraint cannot force the ordering between nearest
neighbours). Thus, every nearest-neighbour ordering specified by x agrees with the order
specified by Maj(µ). Thus, x is a Hamiltonian chain in Maj(µ).
“⊇” Conversely, let x be a Hamiltonian chain in Maj(µ), which represents the linear
ordering m1
x≺ m2
x≺ · · · x≺ mN of [1...N ]. Let γ be any path such that γ(1) = (m1,m2),
γ(2) = (m2,m3), . . . , γ(N − 1) = (mN−1,mN) (the rest of γ is arbitrary). Thus, in the
first N − 1 steps, γ decides the pair-orderings m1 ≺ m2, m2 ≺ m3, . . . , mN−1 ≺ mN ,
each through majority vote. At this point, the rest of F γ(µ) is forced to equal x by
transitivity constraints.
(b) “⇒” (by contrapositive) Let x ∈ Cond (XprN , µ) with a1
x≺ a2
x≺ · · · x≺ aN , and
suppose that for some k < l, m = ak and n = al, so that m
x≺ n by transitivity of x≺. By
part (a), the nearest-neighbour orderings in
x≺ agree with the orderings specified by µ≺,
hence m = ak
µ≺ ak+1, ak+1
µ≺ ak+2, · · · , al−1
µ≺ al = n, i.e. m
µ∗ n.
“⇐” (by contrapositive) Conversely, suppose that m µ∗ n, and assume without loss of
generality that m 6= n. Let A := {ak, ak+1, · · · , al} be a minimal set such that ak = m,
31
al = n and ak
µ≺ ak+1, ak+1
µ≺ ak+2, · · · , al−1
µ≺ al. Consider any path γ that decides
the issues (ak, ak+1), (ak+1, ak+2), . . . , (al−1, al) first, and let x = F
γ(µ). By minimality
of A, there are no transitivity constraints among these first l − k decisions, thus they
all agree with the majority view, i.e. m = ak
x≺ ak+1
x≺ · · · x≺ al = n. Hence, m
x≺ n by
transitivity. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.2. “=⇒” Let n ∈ C∗(A, µ), and choose x ∈ Cond (X,µ) such that
n is
x≺-maximal in A. Let x≺ be given by a1
x≺ a2
x≺ · · · x≺ aN , and let n = ak, so that
A ⊆ {a1, · · · ak}. By Proposition 2.1 (a), we have a1
µ≺ a2, a2
µ≺ a3, · · · , ak−1
µ≺ ak, and
hence al
µ∗ ak for all l = 1 . . . k. This shows that n = ak is
µ∗-maximal in A.
“⇐=” Let n be µ∗-maximal in A. Consider the set {a1, . . . , aM} of all
µ∗-maximal
elements in A, and suppose n = aM and a1
µ≺ a2
µ≺ · · · µ≺ aM
µ≺ a1. Choose y ∈ XprN
representing an ordering
y≺ such that aM is
y≺-maximal in A, and a1
y≺ a2
y≺ a3
y≺ · · · y≺
aM . If y ∈ Cond (X,µ), then we’re done. If y 6∈ Cond (X,µ), then there exists some
x ∈ Cond (X,µ) such that M(y, µ) ⊆ M(x, µ). By Proposition 2.1 (b), {a1, . . . , aM}
form the top M elements of
x≺ in A, and aM must be maximal among them, because
M(x, µ) ⊇ M(y, µ) ⊇ {(a1 ≺ a2), (a2 ≺ a3), . . . , (aM−1 ≺ aM)}.
It follows that aM is the
x≺-maximal element of A, as desired. 2
Proposition 2.4 follows from Theorem 2.5. To prove Theorem 2.5, we need a lemma and
some further notation. Recall (footnote 6) that the Slater rule minimizes the Hamming
distance to Maj(µ). The next lemma clarifies what this means in the discrete cube [0...M ]D.
For any x,y ∈ [0...M ]D, we define
d1(x,y) :=
D∑
d=1
|xd − yd|.
(This is the metric induced by the ℓ1 norm on RD). Let ∆([0...M ]D) be the set of all
probability distributions on [0...M ]D —that is, all functions ν : [0...M ]D−→[0, 1] such that∑
m∈[0...M ]D
ν(m) = 1. For any ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]D) and all d ∈ [1...D], we define a nonincreasing
function νd : [0 . . .M+1]−→[0, 1] by
νd(n) :=
∑{
ν(m) ; m = (m1, . . . ,mD) ∈ [0...M ]D and md ≥ n
}
, (A1)
for every n ∈ [0...M ], while νd(M + 1) := 0. Let
∆∗([0...M ]D) :=
{
ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]D) ; νd(m) 6= 12 , ∀ n ∈ [0...M ] and ∀ d ∈ [1...D]
}
.
If ν ∈ ∆∗([0...M ]D), then the median of ν is the (unique) point m∗ ∈ [0...M ]D such that,
for all d ∈ [1...D], we have νd(m∗d) > 12 > νd(m∗d + 1).
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Lemma A.1 Define Φ : [0...M ]D−→{0, 1}D×M by equation (5) in §2.2.
(a) Φ is an isometry from the metric d1 on [0...M ]
D to the Hamming metric on
{0, 1}D×M . That is: for all x,y ∈ [0...M ]D, we have dH(Φ(x),Φ(y)) = d1(x,y).
(b) Let P ⊆ [0...M ]D and let X := Φ[P ] ⊂ {0, 1}D×M . Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X). Define
ν ∈ ∆([0...M ]D) by ν(m) := µ[Φ(m)] for all m ∈ [0...M ]D. Then ν ∈ ∆∗([0...M ]D).
If m∗ is the median of ν, then Φ(m∗) = Maj(µ).
(c) Thus, if S is the set of all points in P of minimal d1-distance from m
∗, then
Slater (X,µ) = Φ[S].
For any r > 0, let ♦(m∗, r) := {n ∈ ZD ; d1(n,m∗) = r} be the ‘sphere’ of radius r
around the medianm∗ in the d1 metric on ZD —this will be a polytope with 2D faces, each
of which is a D-dimensional simplex. (For example, if D = 3, then ♦(m∗, r) is a regular
octahedron). In Lemma A.1(c), we have S = P ∩ ♦(m∗, r) for some r ∈ N. If P = △DM is
the simplex defined in eqn.(6), then typically this intersection will be between P and one
of the two simplicial faces of ♦(m∗, r) which lies parallel to P —see Figure 2.
Proof of Lemma A.1. (a) Let x = (x1, . . . , xD) and y = (y1, . . . , yD) be elements of
[0...M ]D. Let x˜ := Φ(x) and y˜ := Φ(y) (elements of {0, 1}M×D). For all d ∈ [1...D], if
xd < yd, then we have x˜(d,m) = 0 6= 1 = y˜(d,m) for all m ∈ [xd + 1 . . . yd]. If yd < xd, then
we have y˜(d,m) = 0 6= 1 = x˜(d,m) for all m ∈ [yd + 1 . . . xd]. Either way, x˜(d,m) = y˜(d,m)
for all other m ∈ [1...M ], so that x˜ and y˜ differ in exactly |xd − yd| of the coordinates
(d, 1), . . . , (d,M). This holds for all d ∈ [1..D]; hence dH(x˜, y˜) = |x1 − y1|+ · · ·+ |xD −
yD| = d1(x,y).
(b) Let x := Maj(µ); we must show that x = Φ(m∗). For all d ∈ [1...D] and n ∈ [1...M ],
combining the defining equations (1), (5), and (A1) yields µ(d,n)(1) = νd(n). Thus,(
x(d,n) = 1
)
⇐⇒
(
µ(d,n)(1) >
1
2
)
⇐⇒
(
νd(n) >
1
2
)
⇐⇒
(
m∗d ≥ n
)
⇐
(5)
⇒
(
Φ(m∗)(d,n) = 1
)
.
Thus, x(d,n) = Φ(m
∗)(d,n), for all d ∈ [1...D] and n ∈ [1...M ], as desired.
(c) This follows by combining (a) and (b) 2
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Let m∗ ∈ [0...M ]D be the median point from Lemma A.1(b); thus,
Φ(m∗) = Maj(µ). Note that m∗ must automatically satisfy the constraints Ad ≤ m∗d ≤
Ad, for all d ∈ [1...D] (because every point in X satisfies these constraints). There are
three cases: either S ≤
D∑
d=1
m∗d ≤ S, or
D∑
d=1
m∗d > S, or
D∑
d=1
m∗d < S.
If S ≤
D∑
d=1
m∗d ≤ S, then Maj(µ) ∈ X, in which case Lemma 1.1(a) implies that
Cond (X,µ) = Maj(µ). Clearly, Slater (X,µ) = Maj(µ) also, so we’re done.
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Figure 2: The Condorcet (=Slater) rule on the simplex. Here, Maj(X∆M,D, µ) = Φ[m
∗] and
Cond
(
X∆M,D, µ
)
= Slater
(
X∆M,D, µ
)
= Φ[S], where S is the intersection of △DM with another, parallel
simplex. Figures (a) and (b) illustrate the case when m∗ is above the simplex. (c) illustrates the case
when m∗ is below the simplex.
If
D∑
d=1
m∗d > S, then m
∗ lies ‘above’ the polytope (as in Figures 2(a,b)). We define
O :=
{
n ∈ ZD ; nd ≤ m∗d, ∀ d ∈ [1..D]
}
and P+ :=
{
m ∈ [0...M ]D ;
D∑
d=1
md = S and Ad ≤ md ≤ Ad, ∀ d ∈ [1...D]
}
.
Intuitively, O is the ‘negative orthant’ with its origin atm∗, and P+ is the ‘top face’ of the
allocation polytope PDS,A defined in eqn.(7). Let S := O∩P+; then Cond (X,µ) = Φ[S].
However, if R :=
D∑
d=1
m∗d − S, then we have S = ♦(m∗, R) ∩ PDS,A —in other words, S
is the set of points in PDS,A minimizing the d1-distance to m
∗; thus, Lemma A.1(c) says
Slater (X,µ) = Φ[S]. Thus, Slater (X,µ) = Cond (X,µ), as claimed.
If
D∑
d=1
m∗d < S, then the argument is similar, except that now m
∗ lies ‘below’ PDS,A (as in
Figures 2(c)), so we define O to be the ‘positive’ orthant based at m∗, and we intersect
it with the ‘bottom’ face of PDS,A. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.7. “⇐=” Let Maj(µ) = 1F In with disjoint and non-adjacent
intervals I1, . . . IN , and let J be the smallest interval containing In and Im. Let ℓn be
the left-most element of In, and rm the right-most element of Im. Since x = 1J respects
the majority view in the issues ℓn − 1, ℓn, rm and rm + 1, and since any element of X lineK
has to represent an interval, it is evident that x ∈ Cond (X lineK , µ).
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) Let J be an interval such that its left-most element does
not coincide with a left-most element of some In, or its right-most element does not
coincide with a right-most element of some Im. Then, obviously, the majority view can
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be respected in at least one additional issue. For instance, if the left-most element ℓJ
of J is in the interior of some In, then 1J ′ ∈ X lineK with J ′ = J ∪ {ℓJ − 1} respects the
majority view in a strictly larger set of issues. 2
Notation A.2. Let J ⊂ [1...K], and let w ∈ {0, 1}J . We define [w] := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ;
w ⊑ x}. Thus, w is X-forbidden if and only if X ∩ [w] = ∅. It is sometimes convenient
to express w as an element of {0, 1, ∗}K , where we define wk = ∗ for all k 6∈ J . For
example, suppose J = {i, i + 1, . . . , j} for some i ≤ j ≤ K; then we would write w =
(∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, wi, wi+1, . . . , wj, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−j
).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), and let Unan(µ) := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; x does not
violate µ-unanimity}.
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) Let w be an X-critical fragment with |w| = N + 1 for some
N ≥ 3. By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can write
w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN , wN+1, ∗, ∗, . . . , ∗),
where w1, . . . , wN+1 ∈ {0, 1}. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N+1], let wn := (w1, . . . , wn−1, ∗, wn+1,
. . . , wN+1, ∗, ∗, . . . , ∗). For all n ∈ [1 . . . N+1], there exists some xn ∈ [wn]∩X (because
wn is not X-forbidden because w is X-critical). Define µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) by µ(xn) = 1/N for
all n ∈ [1...N ]. Then µn[wn] = (N − 1)/N ≥ 2/3 (because N ≥ 3) for all n ∈ [1...N ],
while µN+1[wN+1] = 1, so Maj(µ) ∈ [w]. Now, let γ be the path (1, 2, 3, . . . , K), and let
x := F γ(µ); then x ∈ Cond (X,µ) ∩ [wN+1] (because wN+1 is not X-forbidden). But
xN+1 6= wN+1 (because w is X-forbidden). Thus, x 6∈ Unan(µ) (because µN+1[wN+1] =
1). Thus, Condorcet violates unanimity.
“⇐=” Suppose that all critical fragments have order 3 or less. If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then
Cond (X,µ) = {Maj(µ)} and we’re done, because Maj(µ) ∈ Unan(µ).
Suppose Maj(µ) 6∈ X, and let y ∈ Cond (X,µ).
Claim 1: Let k ∈ [1...K]. If yk 6= Majk(µ), then µk(Majk(µ)) < 1.
Proof: If yk 6= Majk(µ), then there exist i, j ∈ [1...K]\{k} and some X-critical fragment
w = (wi, wj, wk) < Maj(µ) such that yi = wi and yj = wj, thereby forcing yk 6= wk.
(If there was no such critical fragment, then we could change yk to Majk(µ) without
leaving X —hence y 6∈ Cond (X,µ)).
By contradiction, suppose µk[wk] = 1. Note that µi[wi] >
1
2
and µj[wj] >
1
2
(because
w < Maj(µ)). Thus, µi[¬wi] < 12 and µj[¬wj] < 12 , and of course, µk[¬wk] = 0. But
X \ [w] ⊂ [¬wi] ∪ [¬wj] ∪ [¬wk]; thus, µ(X \ [w]) ≤ µ[¬wi] + µ[¬wj] + µ[¬wk] <
1
2
+ 1
2
+0 = 1. But if µ(X \ [w]) < 1, then µ(X ∩ [w]) > 0, which means [w]∩X 6= ∅,
contradicting the fact that w is an X-forbidden fragment.
By contradiction, we must have µk[wk] < 1. 3 Claim 1
The contrapositive of Claim 1 says that yk = Majk(µ) whenever µk(Majk(µ)) = 1; thus,
y ∈ Unan(µ). This holds for all y ∈ Cond (X,µ); hence Cond (X,µ) ⊆ Unan(µ), as
desired. 2
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Proof of Example 3.3(a). (This is a special case of the proof of Example 3.3(b) below).
“κ(XprN ) ≤ N”: Any XprN -forbidden fragment corresponds to a ‘preference cycle’ a1 ≺
a2 ≺ · · · ≺ aM ≺ a1 (creating a transitivity violation), for some a1, . . . , aM ∈ [1...N ];
such a cycle can have at most N elements. Furthermore, this XprN -forbidden fragment
is critical if it only specifies the ordering between nearest neighbours in the preference
cycle (otherwise it has redundant coordinates which can be removed to obtain a forbidden
subfragment). Thus a XprN -critical fragment requires at most N coordinates.
“κ(XprN ) ≥ N”: Let w be the fragment of order N representing the set of N assertions:
{1 ≺ 2, 2 ≺ 3, 3 ≺ 4, . . ., (N − 1) ≺ N , N ≺ 1}. Then w is forbidden (it creates a
cycle), but no subfragment of w is forbidden; hence w is XprN -critical. 2
Notation: For any subset I ⊂ [1...K], we define 1∗I to be the fragment x such that xi := 1
for all i ∈ I and xk := ∗ for all k ∈ [1...K] \ I.
Proof of Example 3.3(b). Let W := width(). We must show that κ(Xpr ) = W .
Recall that K = N(N − 1)/2 and XprN ⊂ {0, 1}K is defined by identifying [1...K] with
some subset of [1...N ]×[1...N ] containing exactly one element of each pair {(n,m), (m,n)}
for each distinct n,m ∈ N. By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can suppose that the
partial ordering  is obtained by fixing the values of the coordinates [J+1 . . . K] for
some J ∈ [1...K]. Thus, we can regard Xpr as a subset of {0, 1}J .
“κ(Xpr ) ≥ W” Let A := {a1, . . . , aW} ⊆ [1...N ] be an antichain of cardinality W . Let
I ⊂ [1...J ] be the set of coordinates representing theW pairs {(a1, a2), (a2, a3), . . . , (aW−1, aW ),
(aW , a1)}. Thus, the fragment 1∗I represents the (cyclical) binary relation “a1a2 · · ·
aN  a1”. Thus, 1
∗
I is a (X
pr
 )-forbidden fragment.
Now, for any linear ordering of A, there is some element of Xpr which encodes an ex-
tension of this ordering (because A is an antichain of ). Thus, no subfragment of
1∗I is (X
pr
 )-forbidden; hence 1
∗
I is a (X
pr
 )-critical fragment. Clearly, |1∗I | = W . Thus,
κ(Xpr ) ≥ W .
“κ(Xpr ) ≤ W” (by contradiction) Let v be a (Xpr )-critical fragment, and suppose
|v| > W . Then v must encode a cyclical binary relation “b1
v≺ b2
v≺ · · · v≺ bV
v≺ b1”,
for some subset B := {b1, . . . , bV } ⊂ [1...N ]. Let I ⊂ [1...J ] be the set of V coordinates
representing the V pairs {(b1, b2), (b2, b3), . . . , (bV−1, bV ), (bV , b1)};
Claim 1: v = 1∗I ; hence |v| = V .
Proof: (by contradiction) If supp (v) contained any coordinates not linking two elements
from the set {b1, . . . , bV }, then we could remove this coordinate without destroying the
cycle. Likewise, if supp (v) contained (bn, bm) for any n,m ∈ [1...V ] with m 6≡ n ± 1
(mod V ), then we could remove this coordinate without breaking the cycle. Either
way we would obtain a shorter (Xpr )-forbidden fragment, contradicting the minimality
of v. 3 Claim 1
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Now, |B| = V , and Claim 1 implies that V = |v|, while |v| > W by hypothesis. Thus,
|B| > W , so B cannot be a -antichain. Thus, there exist some n,m ∈ [1...V ] such that
bn bm. Clearly, n 6≡ m± 1 (mod V ), because (n, n+1) and (n, n− 1) are represented
by elements of [1...J ] (because they form part of the support of v). If n < m, then we
can remove the elements {bn+1, . . . , bm−1} and get a shorter cycle:
b1
v≺ b2
v≺ · · · v≺ bn  bm
v≺ bm+1
v≺ · · · v≺ bV−1
v≺ bV
v≺ b1.
If n > m, then we can remove the elements {b1, . . . , bm−1} and {bn+1, . . . , bV } and get a
shorter cycle:
bm
v≺ bm+1
v≺ · · · v≺ bn−1
v≺ bn  bm.
Either way, we can construct a smaller (Xpr )-forbidden fragment, which contradicts the
minimality of v. By contradiction, we must have V ≤ W . This argument holds for any
critical fragment v. Thus, κ(Xpr ) ≤ W . 2
Proof of Example 3.3(c). “κ(XeqN ) ≤ N”: Any XeqN -forbidden fragment corresponds to
some ‘broken cycle’ of the form: a1 ∼ a2 ∼ · · · ∼ aM 6∼ a1 (creating a transitivity
violation), for some a1, . . . , aM ∈ [1...N ]; such a broken cycle can have at most N
elements. Furthermore, this XeqN -forbidden fragment is critical only if it specifies only
the (non)equivalences between nearest neighbours in the broken cycle (otherwise it has
redundant coordinates which can be removed to obtain a forbidden subfragment). Thus
an XeqN -critical fragment requires at most N coordinates.
“κ(XeqN ) ≥ N”: let w ∈ XeqN be the fragment of order N representing the set of N
assertions {1 ≡ 2, 2 ≡ 3, 3 ≡ 4, . . ., (N − 1) ≡ N , N 6≡ 1}. Then w is XeqN -forbidden (it
violates transitivity), but no subfragment of w is forbidden; hence w is XeqN -critical. 2
Proof of Example 3.3(e). “κ(X∆M,D) ≤ D”: Let w be a X∆M,D-critical fragment. Suppose
there exist d ∈ [1...D] and n < m ∈ [1...M ] such that w(d,n) = 0 and w(d,m) = 1. Then
we could eliminate all other coordinates from w to obtain a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment
containing only these two coordinates. Thus, if w was X∆M,D-critical, then we must have
w = (w(d,n), w(d,m)); hence |w| = 2.
So, for all d ∈ [1...D] assume that there do not exist any n < m ∈ [1...M ] such that
w(d,n) = 0 and w(d,m) = 1.
Claim 1: For each d ∈ [1...D], supp (w) contains at most one of the coordinates
{(d, 1), (d, 2), . . . , (d,M)}.
Proof: (by contradiction) Let 1 ≤ n < m ≤ M , and suppose (d, n) ∈ supp (w) and
(d,m) ∈ supp (w). If w(d,n) = 1 = w(d,m) then we can remove coordinate w(d,n) and
still have a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment. If w(d,n) = 0 = w(d,m), then we can remove
coordinate w(d,m) and still have a X
∆
M,D-forbidden fragment. Now suppose w(d,n) = 1
and w(d,m) = 0. If ‖w‖ > M then we can remove w(d,m) and still have aX∆M,D-forbidden
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fragment. If ‖w‖ < M , then we can remove w(d,n) and still have a X∆M,D-forbidden
fragment.
In any case, we can remove a coordinate from w to obtain a smaller X∆M,D-forbidden
fragment; hence w is not X∆M,D-critical. 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 implies |w| ≤ D. This holds for any X∆M,D-critical fragment, so κ(X∆M,D) ≤ D.
“κ(X∆M,D) ≥ D”: Let m ∈ [1...M ] be the smallest number such that mD > M ,
and consider the fragment w of order D defined by the D assertions {x1 ≥ m,x2 ≥
m, . . . , xD ≥ m}. This fragment is X∆M,D-forbidden because it requires allocating a total
of mD > M ‘dollars’. No subfragment of w is X∆M,D-forbidden, because (D − 1)m =
mD −m≤
(∗)
mD −D = (m − 1)D≤
(†)
M . (Here (∗) is because D ≤ m because D2 ≤ M ,
and (†) is because m is the smallest number with mD > M). Thus, w is critical. Thus,
κ(X∆M,D) ≥ |w| = D. 2
The proof of Proposition 3.4 requires the following observation:
Lemma A.3 Let C be a convex structure on [1...K]. Any XC-critical fragment has the
form w = (1∗J , 0k), where J ⊂ [1...K] is a Carathe´odory-independent set and k ∈ [1...K] \
conv(J). Thus, |w| = |J |+ 1.
Proof: Let w be a fragment with support I ⊂ [1...K]. Suppose I = I0 ⊔ I1, where
wi = 0 for all i ∈ I0 and wi = 1 for all i ∈ I1. Then w is XC-forbidden if and only if
I0 ∩ conv(I1) 6= ∅. We can strip out all coordinates in I0 \ conv(I1), and all but one of
the coordinates in I0 ∩ conv(I1), and still have a XC-forbidden fragment; hence we can
assume that I0 = {k} some k ∈ conv(I1). Next, find the smallest subset J ⊆ I1 such
that k ∈ conv(J), and strip out all coordinates in I1 \ J ; the result is still XC-forbidden
fragment. At this point, we have k ∈ conv(J) and k 6∈ conv(J) for all J ′ ( J . Thus, J
is Carathe´odory-independent. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.4. To see that κ(XC) ≤ λ(C)+1, let w be any XC-critical fragment,
and let J ⊂ [1...K] be the Carathe´odory-independent set described in Lemma A.3. Then
|w| = |J |+ 1 ≤ λ(C) + 1.
To see that κ(XC) ≥ λ(C) + 1, Let J ⊂ [1...K] be a maximal Carathe´odory-independent
set, so that |J | = λ(C). Let w be as in Lemma A.3. Then w is critical, and |w| =
|J |+ 1 = λ(C) + 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Recall from equation (5) in §2.2 the way in which X∆M,D is
embedded in {0, 1}D×M . Let γ : [1 . . . DM ]−→[1 . . . D]× [1 . . .M ] be any path. For all
d ∈ [1 . . . D], let t(d) := min{t ∈ [1 . . . DM ]; γ(t) = (d,m) for some m ∈ [1, M/3)}.
Find d1, d2, d3 ∈ [1 . . . D] such that t(d1) < t(d2) < t(d3) < t(d) for all other d ∈ [1 . . . D].
For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let xj be the element of X∆M,D which allocates all M dollars towards
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claimant dj. (Thus, for all m ∈ [1...M ], we have xjdj ,m = 1, while xjc,m = 0 for all
c ∈ [1...D] \ {dj}.) Then let µ ∈ ∆(X∆M,D) be the profile with µ[xj] = 13 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Observe that Maj(µ) = 0. Furthermore, observe that µd,m(0) = 1 (unanimity) for all
m ∈ [1 . . .M ] and d ∈ [1 . . . D] \ {d1, d2, d3} (this set is nonempty because D ≥ 4).
By construction, we must have F γ(µ)d1,m1 = F
γ(µ)d2,m2 = F
γ(µ)d3,m3 = 0 for some
m1,m2,m3 ∈ [1, M/3). Thus, F γ(µ) allocates less than M/3 dollars towards each of
claimants d1, d2, d3. Thus, F
γ(µ) must allocate more than 0 dollars towards some other
claimant. That is, F γ(µ)d,m = 1 for some m ∈ [1...M ] and d ∈ [1 . . . D] \ {d1, d2, d3}.
But this violates unanimity in coordinate (d,m). 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Consider the path ζ specified in the statement of the proposition,
and denote by
µ≺ζ the ordering in XprN generated by F ζ(µ).
Claim 1: For any µ,
µ≺ζ extends
µ≺uc.
Proof: The claim is obvious if N ≤ 2. By induction, suppose that the claim holds for all
sets of cardinality l < N . Take n,m such that m
µ≺ n and, for all k, k µ≺ m⇒ k µ≺ n.
If m = 1 or n = 1, we evidently obtain m
µ≺ζ n. Thus, let m,n 6= 1. Now observe that
no binary comparison between alternative 1 and any other alternative k = 2, . . . , N
can ever force n
µ≺ζ m, since by assumption either [1
µ≺ n and 1 µ≺ m], [n µ≺ 1 and
m
µ≺ 1], or [m µ≺ 1 and 1 µ≺ n]. Hence the relative ranking between n and m in the
ordering
µ≺ζ coincides with their relative ranking induced by the application of F ζ to
the set [2...N ]. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, m
µ≺ζ n. 3 Claim 1
Let n,m be such that n
µ≺ζ m but m
µ≺ n. By Claim 1, there must exist k ∈ [1...N ] such
that n
µ≺ k and k µ≺ m. The latter two relations imply that there is at least one voter
who strictly prefers m to k and strictly prefers k to n, hence by transitivity, also m to
n. Thus,
µ≺ζ respects unanimous judgements. 2
For the proof of Theorem 4.2 we need a series of further auxiliary results. The crux of
path-dependence is that earlier precedents can override the majority will in a later decision.
An explanation of how this happens requires a close analysis of the way that paths interact
with critical fragments. If ζ is a path, and k ∈ J ⊂ [1...K], then we say ζ “covers every
other element of J before reaching k” if there is some t ∈ [1 . . . K] such that ζ(t) = k and
J ⊆ ζ([1 . . . t]). Recall that W (X,µ) is the set of X-critical fragments activated by profile
µ. Let w ∈ W (X,µ) and let J := supp (w). If ζ is a path, and k ∈ J , then we say that ζ
focuses w on k if:
(F1) ζ covers every other element of J before reaching k; and
(F2) for all j ∈ J \ {k}, we have F ζj (µ) = wj = Majj(µ); hence
(F3) F ζk (µ) = ¬wk 6= Majk(µ).
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The following result characterizes exactly when diachronic aggregation violates a ma-
jority in a particular coordinate.
Proposition A.4 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K . Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), let k ∈ [1...K], and let ζ be a path
through [1...K]. Then:(
F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
There is some w ∈W (X,µ) such that ζ focuses w on k
)
.
The “⇐=” direction of Proposition A.4 follows immediately from (F3). The proof of
the “=⇒” direction of Proposition A.4 involves a certain combinatorial construction.
If I, J ⊆ [1...K]; then fragments v ∈ {0, 1}I and w ∈ {0, 1}J are compatible if vk = wk
for all k ∈ I ∩ J (hence, if I ∩ J = ∅, then v and w are always compatible). In this case,
we define v ⊎w ∈ {0, 1}I∪J by (v ⊎w)i = vi for all i ∈ I and (v ⊎w)j = wj for all j ∈ J .
A forbidden tree of height 1 is a pair T := (w, j), where w is a critical fragment (called
the wood of T ) and j ∈ supp (w). We say that j is the root of T .
For any h ≥ 2, we inductively define a forbidden tree of height h to be a system T :=
(w, j; T1, . . . , TN), such that:
(T1) w is a critical fragment, and j ∈ supp (w). (Here, j is called the root of T , and w
is the trunk of T .)
(T2) For all n ∈ [1...N ], Tn is a forbidden tree of height h− 1 or less, whose root jn is an
element of supp (w) \ {j}.
(T3) For all n ∈ [1...N ], if subtree Tn has trunk wn, then wnjn = ¬wjn .
(T4) For all n ∈ [1...N ], let w˜n be the wood of Tn, and let Jn := supp (w˜n) \ {jn}.
Finally let J0 := J \ {j1, . . . , jn}. Then the subfamilies wJ0 , w˜1J1 , w˜2J2 , . . . , w˜NJN are
all compatible. The wood of T is the fragment w˜ := wJ0 ⊎ w˜1J1 ⊎ w˜2J2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ w˜NJN .
Note: The wood of T includes the root of T , but not the roots of its subtrees T1, . . . , TN .
In contrast, the support of T is defined inductively:
supp (T ) := supp (w) ∪
N⋃
n=1
supp (Tn) .
Example A.5 Let K = 36, and identify [1...K] with a 6× 6 grid as shown in Figure 3(A).
Let J1 := {1, 2, 3} and suppose w1 := (0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J1 is critical [see Figure 3(B)]. Then
T1 := (w
1, 2) is a forbidden tree of height 1 [see Figure 3(C)]. Let J2 := {2, 8, 14, 20, 26, 32}
and suppose w2 := (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}J2 is critical [see Figure 3(D)]. Then T2 :=
(w2, 26;T1) is a forbidden tree of height 2 [see Figure 3(E)]. Let J3 := {25, 26, 27, 28, 29} and
suppose w3 := (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J3 is critical [see Figure 3(F)]. Then T3 := (w3, 28;T2)
is a forbidden tree of height 3 [see Figure 3(G)]. Let J4 := {14, 15, 16, 17, 18} and suppose
w4 := (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ {0, 1}J4 is critical [see Figure 3(H)]. Then T4 := (w4, 16) is a forbidden
tree of height 1 [see Figure 3(I)]. Finally, let J5 := {16, 22, 28, 34} and suppose w5 :=
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T4 := (w4, 16) T5 := (w5, 34; T3, T4)
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T5  (schematic)
Figure 3: Construction of forbidden trees. Boxes labelled ‘0’ or ‘1’ are part of the wood of the tree.
Boxes labelled ‘∗’ are in the support of the tree, but not its wood. The shaded boxes are the roots of the
trees. See Example A.5 for explanation.
(1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}J5 is critical [see Figure 3(J)]. Then T5 := (w5, 34;T3, T4) is a forbidden
tree of height 4, shown in Figure 3(K). A ‘schematic’ of T5 is shown in Figure 3(L).
Observe that two ‘branches’ of T5 overlap in coordinate 14, but they are compatible because
w214 = 1 = w
4
14; this is the significance of condition (T4). The support of T5 is all entries
in Figure 3(K) containing ‘0’, ‘1’, or ‘*’. The wood of T5 is all entries in Figure 3(K)
containing a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ (but not a ‘*’). ♦
For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), we say that µ activates the tree T if µ activates the wood of T .
Lemma A.6 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) Let w˜ be the wood of a forbidden tree. Then w˜ is itself a forbidden fragment for
X.
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(b) Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), let k ∈ [1...K], and let ζ be a path such that F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ).
Then k is the root of a forbidden tree T activated by µ, such that:
(b1) ζ covers every other element of supp (T ) before reaching k; and
(b2) if w˜ is the wood of T , then for all j ∈ supp (w˜)\{k} we have F ζj (µ) = Majj(µ) =
w˜j.
Proof: (a) (by induction on height) If T is a tree of height 1, then T := (w, j), and its
wood is the forbidden fragment w by definition.
Now let h ≥ 2 and inductively suppose the claim is true for all trees of height less
than h. Let T := (w, j, T1, . . . , TN) be a forbidden tree of height h, with wood w˜ and
let J˜ = supp (w˜). Let x ∈ X, and suppose (by contradiction) that x eJ = w˜. Let
J := supp (w). For all n ∈ [1...N ], let forbidden tree Tn have root jn ∈ J .
Claim 1: (a) For all n ∈ [1...N ], we have xjn = wjn .
(b) Also, xJ\{j1,...,jN} = wJ\{j1,...,jN}.
Proof: (a) Fix n ∈ [1...N ]. Let Tn have wood wn and let Jn := supp (wn); then
w˜Jn∩ eJ = w
n
Jn∩ eJ by definition of ‘wood’ in condition (T4). Thus, xJn∩ eJ = w
n
Jn∩ eJ ,
because x eJ = w˜ by hypothesis. But Jn∩ J˜ = Jn\{jn}, so we have xJn\{jn} = wnJn\{jn}.
We must then have xjn = ¬wnjn , because wn is a forbidden fragment (by induction
hypothesis). Thus, xjn = wjn , because wjn = ¬wnjn by (T3).
(b) J \ {j1, . . . , jN} = J˜ ∩ J and w˜ eJ∩J = w eJ∩J (by definition of ‘wood’ in (T4)); thus
xJ\{j1,...,jN} = wJ\{j1,...,jN} (because x eJ = w˜ by hypothesis). 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 implies that xJ = w. But w is a forbidden fragment (by (T1)). Contradiction.
Thus, for all x ∈ X we must have x eJ 6= w˜; hence w˜ is a forbidden fragment, as desired.
(b) Suppose k = γ(t) for some t ∈ [1...K]. If F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then we must have
t ≥ 2. We will prove the claim by induction on t.
Base case. If t = 2, then let J := {ζ(1), ζ(2)} and w := MajJ(µ); then w must be a
critical fragment, so (w, k) is a forbidden tree of height 1.
Induction. If t ≥ 3, and F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then there must exist some subset J ⊆
{ζ(1), . . . , ζ(t)} including k = ζ(t) such that, if we define wk := Majk(µ), and define
wj := F
ζ
j (µ) for all j ∈ J \ {k}, then w ∈ {0, 1}J is a forbidden fragment for X. By
choosing J to be a minimal subset with this property, we can assume w is critical.
Let {j1, . . . , jN} be the set of all elements of J \ {k} such that Majjn(µ) 6= wjn . By
induction hypothesis, each jn is the root of a µ-activated forbidden tree Tn such that
(b1′) ζ covers every other element of supp (Tn) before reaching jn; and
(b2′) if wn is the wood of Tn and Jn := supp (w
n), then for all j ∈ Jn \ {jn}, we have
F ζj (µ) = Majj(µ) = w
n
j .
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Let T := (w, k; T1, . . . , TN); we claim T is a forbidden tree. (T1) is true because w
is a critical fragment by construction. (T2) is true by definition of T1, . . . , Tn. To see
(T3), note for all n ∈ [1...N ] that µ activates wn by hypothesis, so wnjn = Majjn(µ),
whereas wjn 6= Majjn(µ) by definition of {j1, . . . , jN}; thus wnjn = ¬wjn . To see (T4),
observe that the woods of T1, . . . , TN are all compatible because they are all subfamilies
of F ζ(µ), by condition (b2′). Finally, properties (b1) and (b2) follow immediately from
the definitions of J and T , and properties (b1′) and (b2′). 2
Proof of Proposition A.4 “=⇒”. Let µ, k, and ζ by as in the statement of the Proposition.
Lemma A.6(b) says that k is the root of a µ-activated forbidden tree T satisfying (b1)
and (b2). Let w˜ be the wood of T ; then Lemma A.6(a) says that w˜ is itself a forbidden
fragment. Let J˜ := supp (w˜); then k ∈ J˜ , and w˜ eJ\{k} is not forbidden, by (b2). Thus,
any forbidden subfragment of w˜ must contain coordinate k. Since J˜ is finite, there exists
some J ⊆ J˜ (with k ∈ J) such that w := w˜J is a minimal forbidden subfragment —i.e.
a critical fragment. At this point, (F1) follows from (b1), (F2) follows from (b2), and
(F3) is true because F ζk (µ) 6= Majk(µ) by hypothesis. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We first establish two claims.
Claim 1: Indet(µ) = {k ∈ [1...K]; there exists a path γ such that F γk (µ) 6= Majk(µ)}.
Proof: “⊆” Proposition 1.3(b) says that k ∈ Indet(µ) if and only if there are paths γ
and ζ such that F γk (µ) 6= F ζk (µ). Either F γk (µ) = Majk(µ) or F ζk (µ) = Majk(µ). If
F ζk (µ) = Majk(µ), then F
γ
k (µ) 6= Majk(µ).
“⊇” Suppose Majk(µ) = x. If ζ is any path such that ζ(1) = k, then F ζk (µ) = x.
Thus, if γ is some path such that F γk (µ) 6= Majk(µ), then F γk (µ) 6= F ζk (µ); hence
k ∈ Indet(µ). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For any w ∈W (X,µ) and k ∈ supp (w), there is a path focusing w on k.
Proof: Suppose supp (w) = J := {j1, j2, . . . , jN}, where jN = k. Let γ be a path such
that γ(n) = jn for all n ∈ [1...N ], after which γ traverses the rest of [1...K] in some
order (this gives (F1)). For all j ∈ J we have Majj(µ) = wj (because w is activated
by µ, by hypothesis). Thus, we have F γj (µ) = wj for all j ∈ J \ {k} (because wJ\{k} is
not forbidden, because w is critical); this yields (F2). But then F γk (µ) 6= wk, because
w is forbidden in X; this yields (F3). 3 Claim 2
Now let B :=
⋃
w∈W (X,µ)
supp (w). We must show that Indet(µ) = B.
We have Indet(µ) ⊆ B by Claim 1 and Proposition A.4“=⇒”.
To see that Indet(µ) ⊇ B, let w ∈W (X,µ), and let k ∈ supp (w). Claim 2 says there
is a path γ which focuses w on k. Then Proposition A.4“⇐=” implies that F γk (µ) 6=
Majk(µ); hence Claim 1 says k ∈ Indet(µ). 2
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The following result offers a diagnosis of the diachronic unanimity violations analyzed
in §3 that is more refined than that of Theorem 3.2.
Proposition A.7 Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and suppose µ is unanimous in coordinate k ∈ [1...K]. There
exists a path γ such that F γ(µ) violates µ-unanimity in coordinate k if and only if
k ∈ supp (w) for some w ∈W (X,µ) with |w| ≥ 4.
(b) Let w be a critical fragment for X, with |w| ≥ 4. For every k ∈ supp (w),
there exists some µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and path γ such that F γ(µ) violates µ-unanimity in
coordinate k.
Proof: (a) “=⇒” If path γ violates µ-unanimity in coordinate k, then in particular
F γk (µ) 6= Majk(µ). Thus, Proposition A.4 yields a µ-activated critical fragment w which
ζ focuses on k (in particular, k ∈ supp (w)).
It remains to show that |w| ≥ 4. By contradiction, suppose |w| = 3 (the case |w| = 2
is even easier). By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can suppose supp (w) = {1, 2, 3}
and k = 1. Thus, µ1(w1) = 1. Thus µ2(w2) + µ3(w3) ≤ 1 (otherwise we would have
µJ(w) > 0, contradicting the fact that µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and w is forbidden). Thus, either
µ2(w2) <
1
2
or µ3(w3) <
1
2
. Thus, either Maj2(µ) 6= w2 or Maj3(µ) 6= w3. But this
contradicts the fact that µ activates w.
“⇐=” After suitably reordering [1...K], we can assume that supp (w) = {1, 2, . . . , J+1}
and k = J+1, for some J ∈ [3 . . . K−1]. Let ζ be the path: (1, 2, 3, . . . , J, J+1, . . . , K).
Then for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}, we have F ζj (µ) = wj because µ activates w. Then
X-consistency requires F ζJ+1(µ) = ¬wJ+1 (because w is forbidden), which violates µ-
unanimity (because µJ+1[wJ+1] = 1 by hypothesis).
(b) As in the proof of (a)“⇐=”, we can assume supp (w) = {1, 2, . . . , J + 1} and
k = J+1, for some J ∈ [3 . . . K−1]. Without loss of generality, supposew = (0, 0, . . . , 0)
(negate certain coordinates of X if necessary to make this true). For all j ∈ [1 . . . J ],
there exists some xj ∈ X of the form
xj := (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
J−j
, 0, ∗, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−J
),
where “∗, . . . , ∗” represents anyX-admissible completion (such an xj ∈ X exists precisely
because w is a minimal forbidden fragment). Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) be the profile such that
µ(xj) = 1
J
for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}. Then µJ+1(1) = 0, while for all j ∈ [1...J ], we have
µj(1) =
1
J
≤ 1
3
< 1
2
(because J = |w| − 1 ≥ 4 − 1 = 3). Thus, µ activates w. Now
(a)“⇐=” yields a path γ which violates µ-unanimity in coordinate J + 1. 2
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. (a) Every coordinate of x defines an edge in the x-tournament.
Every XprN -critical fragment corresponds to a cycle —the coordinates of that fragment
are the edges making up the cycle. Thus,(
x ∈ Crit(XprN )
)
⇐⇒
(
Every coordinate of x is part of some XprN -critical fragment
)
⇐⇒
(
Every edge in the x-tournament is part of some cycle
)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that(
Every edge in the x-tournament is part of some cycle
)
⇐⇒
(
topcycle(x) contains every element of [1...N ]
)
.
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) Find some a, b ∈ [1...N ] such that a is in topcycle(x), whereas
b is not. Then the edge (a, b) is not contained in any cycle of the x-tournament.
“⇐=” By reordering [1...N ] if necessary, suppose topcycle(x) = (1 x≺ 2 x≺ 3 x≺ · · · x≺
N
x≺ 1). Let n,m ∈ [1...N ]. The order ( x≺) is complete, so either m x≺ n or n x≺ m.
Suppose n
x≺ m. We must construct an x-cycle containing the link “ n x≺ m”. The
construction is similar to the last paragraph in the proof of Example 3.3(b). If n < m,
then we can remove the elements {n+1, . . . ,m−1} from topcycle(x) to obtain the cycle:
1
x≺ 2 x≺ · · · x≺ n x≺ m x≺ m+ 1 x≺ · · · x≺ N w≺ 1.
If n > m, then we can remove the elements {1, . . . ,m− 1} and {n+ 1, . . . , N} from
topcycle(x) to obtain the cycle:
m
x≺ m+ 1 x≺ · · · x≺ n− 1 x≺ n x≺ m.
Either way, we get a cycle containing the the link “n
x≺ m”, as desired.
(b) The point x defines an undirected graph on [1...N ], where a
x∼ b iff x(a,b) = 1. A
broken cycle in x is a sequence a1
x∼ a2 x∼ · · · x∼ aM 6 x∼ a1, where a1, . . . , aM ∈ [1...N ] are
all distinct. We say that the pairs (a1, a2), . . . , (aM−1, aM) and (aM , a1) belong to this
broken cycle. Every XeqN -critical fragment corresponds to some broken cycle. Thus,(
x ∈ Crit(XeqN )
)
⇐⇒
(
Every coordinate of x is part of some XeqN -critical fragment
)
⇐⇒
(
For all a, b ∈ [1...N ], the pair (a, b) belongs to some broken cycle in x
)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that(
For all a, b ∈ [1...N ], the pair (a, b) belongs to some broken cycle in x
)
⇐⇒
(
The x-graph is connected but not complete
)
.
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“=⇒” (Connected) Let a, b ∈ [1...N ]. Then (a, b) belongs to a broken cycle of x. If the
edge a ∼ b is one of the ‘unbroken’ links in this cycle, then a x∼ b, so they are adjacent
(hence, connected) in the x-graph. If the edge a ∼ b is the ‘broken’ link in the cycle,
then the remaining (unbroken) links of the cycle define a path from a to b in the x-graph,
so a and b are connected.
(Incomplete —by contrapositive) If the x-graph was complete, then there would be no
broken links, and hence, no broken cycles.
“⇐=” Let a, b ∈ [1...N ]; we must find a broken cycle in x containing the link (a, b).
Case 1. (a 6 x∼ b) Since the x-graph is connected, there is some path in x connecting a
to b; assume this path contains no repeated entries. Then this path, together with the
‘broken’ link a 6 x∼ b, defines a broken cycle in x containing (a, b).
Case 2. (a
x∼ b) Since the x-graph is not complete, there exist some c, d ∈ [1...K] such
that c 6 x∼ d. Since the x-graph is connected, there is a path in x connecting d to a.
Connecting the link a
x∼ b to this path yields a path from d to b. If b 6 x∼ d, then the
broken link b 6 x∼ d plus the aforementioned path yields a broken cycle containing the link
(a, b).
So, assume b
x∼ d. Since the x-graph is connected, there is also a path in x connecting c
to a. Connecting the links a
x∼ b and b x∼ d to this path yields a path from c to d; then
connecting the broken link c 6 x∼ d yields a broken cycle containing (a, b). 2
In the next few proofs, we will use the following terminology. Say a fragment w covers
some coordinate k ∈ [1...K] if k ∈ supp (w). Let x ∈ {0, 1}K . A collection {wj}Jj=1 of
fragments covers x if wj ⊑ x for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ], and
⋃J
j=1 supp (wj) = [1...K] (i.e. every
coordinate in [1...K] is covered by some fragment). If {wj}Jj=1 is a collection of critical
fragments, then this is called a critical cover of x. (Thus, x is ‘critical’ if and only if it
admits a critical cover.)
Proof of Proposition 4.9. We must show that Crit(X) = {0}.
Claim 1: Let w be any X-critical fragment. Then w is all zeros.
Proof: (by contradiction) Suppose w was not all zeros. By reordering [1...K] if necessary,
suppose that
w = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
, ∗, . . . , ∗).
Let w′ = (∗,
N−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
M︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, ∗, . . . , ∗). Then w′ is not X-forbidden (because w is
X-critical). Thus, there exists some x′ ∈ X such that w′ < x. Define x ∈ {0, 1}K by
x1 := 1 and xk := x
′
k for all k ≥ 2. Then x ≥ x′. Thus, x ∈ X because x′ ∈ X and X
is comprehensive. But w < x, and w is X-forbidden. Contradiction. 3 Claim 1
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Now, by nondegeneracy, for every k ∈ [1...K] there is some critical fragmentwk ∈W3(X)
such that k ∈ supp (wk). By Claim 1, wk is all zeros. Thus, the collection {wk}Kk=1 is a
critical covering of 0, so 0 ∈ Crit(X).
Conversely if x ∈ Crit(X), then we must have x = 0, because Claim 1 says that the
fragments covering x are all zeros. Thus, Crit(X) = {0}. 2
The following lemma will be useful in the proofs of Propositions 4.11 and 4.13.
Lemma A.8 Consider the committee selection problem XcomI.J ;K . For all I ≤ J , we have
Crit(XcomI.J ;K) ⊆ {0,1}. Moreover, if I > 0 then 0 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K), and if J < K then
1 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K).
Proof: Evidently, the critical fragments of XcomI,J ;K are given as follows: if I > 0, then all
fragments of exactly K − I +1 zeros are critical; moreover, if J < K, then all fragments
of exactly J + 1 ones are critical. No other fragments are critical. This implies at once
that 0 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K) if I > 0, and 1 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K) if J < K. Moreover, I ≤ J , so
(K − I + 1) + (J + 1) > K, so no element x ∈ {0, 1}K different from 0 and 1 can be
critical for XcomI,J ;K . 2
Proof of Proposition 4.11. By Lemma A.8, Crit(XcomI.J ;K) = {0,1}. First, assume that
K/2 < J . For each l ∈ [1...K], denote by xl the element of XcomI,J ;K with xlk = 1 for
k = l, l + 1, . . . , l + J (mod K), and xk = 0 otherwise. Evidently, for the profile µ that
assigns weight 1/K to each xl, l ∈ [1...K], one obtains Maj(µ) = 1. Next, assume that
I < K/2; by a completely symmetric argument, one shows that 0 ∈ Maj(XcomI,J ;K) in this
case. Thus, in either case XcomI,J ;K is issue-wise indeterminate by Theorem 4.3(b).
Now assume that J ≤ K/2 ≤ I, which is only possible if K is even and I = J = K/2.
As is easily verified, Maj(XcomK
2
,K
2
;K
) ∩ {0,1} = ∅ in this case. For instance, suppose
that Maj(µ) specifies a zero in each of the first K − 1 coordinates, then µ must contain
strictly more ones than zeros in coordinate K; hence [Maj(µ)]K = 1. Thus, X
com
K
2
,K
2
;K
is
not issue-wise indeterminate, again by Theorem 4.3(b). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.7. By Proposition 6.2(b) in Nehring and Pivato (2011a), XC is
McGarvey if and only if C contains all singletons. Thus, it suffices to show that in this
case, Crit(XC) 6= ∅. Let J ⊆ [1...K] be a minimal subset such that conv(J) = [1...K];
we will show that 1J ∈ Crit(XC). Let k ∈ [1...K], and let I ⊆ J ; we say that I is a
J-frame for k if k ∈ conv(I), but k 6∈ conv(H) for any proper subset H ⊂ I.
Let k ∈ [1...K] \ J (so (1J)k = 0). By hypothesis, k ∈ conv(J). Let I ⊆ J be a J-frame
for k. Then I is Carathe´odory-independent (because k ∈ conv(I) but k 6∈ conv(H)
for any H ( I). Thus, Lemma A.3 says the fragment (1I , 0k) is critical, and clearly
(1I , 0k)k = 0 = (1J)k. Thus, every k ∈ [1...K] \ J is covered by some critical fragment
compatible with 1J .
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Next, let j ∈ J (so (1J)j = 1). Let k ∈ [1...K] \ conv(J \ {j}) (this set is nonempty
precisely because J is a minimal spanning set for [1...K]). Let I ⊆ J be a J-frame for
k. Then I 6⊆ J \ {j}, because k 6∈ conv(J \ {j}); thus, j ∈ I. Just as in the previous
paragraph, I is Carathe´odory-independent. Thus, Lemma A.3 says the fragment (1I , 0k)
is critical, and clearly (1I , 0k)j = 1 = (1J)j. Thus, every j ∈ J is covered by some critical
fragment compatible with 1J .
The previous two paragraphs combined show that 1J ∈ Crit(XC), as claimed. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.12.
(a) Let w be an X-critical fragment of order K. Then w ∈ Crit(X). For k = 1, 2, 3,
obtain xk from w by negating wk and leaving all the other coordinates the same. Then
xk ∈ X (because w is critical). Define µ ∈ ∆∗3(X) by µ[xk] = 13 for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then Maj(µ) = w; thus, µ is issue-wise indeterminate, by Theorem 4.3(a).
(b) For all z ∈ Z, let [z] be the unique element of [1...N ] such that z ≡ [z] (mod N).
(For example if N = 7 and z = 11, then [z] = 4.) Let x ∈ {0, 1}K represent any
tournament (
x≺) such that,
∀ n,m ∈ [1...N ],
(
m = [n+ k] for some k ∈ N with k < N/2
)
=⇒
(
n
x≺ m
)
. (A2)
(For example, if N = 7, then 5
x≺ 6, 5 x≺ 7, and 5 x≺ 1, because [6− 5] = 1, [7− 5] = 2,
and [1− 5] = 3. However, 5 x≻ 2, 5 x≻ 3, and 5 x≻ 4, because [2− 5] = 4, [3− 5] = 5, and
[4− 5] = 6; see Figure 4(a).)
If N is odd, then condition (A2) completely determines x. If N is even, then for any
n,m ∈ [1...N ] with m = [n+N/2], we also have n = [m+N/2]; in this case, we can set
n
x≺ m or m x≺ n arbitrarily. In any case, topcycle(x) = [1...N ], so Proposition 4.4(a)
implies that x ∈ Crit(XprN ).
Let N = 3q + r for some q ∈ N and r ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Let x1,x2,x3 ∈ XprN correspond to the
preference orders: (1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ N), ((q + 1) ≺ (q + 2) ≺ · · · ≺ N ≺ 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺
(q−1) ≺ q) and ((2q+1) ≺ (2q+2) ≺ (2q+1) ≺ · · · ≺ N ≺ 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ (2q−1) ≺ 2q),
respectively [see Figure 4(b)]. Define µ ∈ ∆∗3(XprN ) by µ[xk] = 13 for k = 1, 2, 3. If
x := Maj(µ), then x satisfies condition (A2), so x ∈ Crit(XprN ); hence µ is issue-wise
indeterminate, by Theorem 4.3(a).
(c) Let A1, A2, A3 ⊂ [1...N ] be three nonempty disjoint subsets such that [1...N ] =
A1 ⊔ A2 ⊔ A3. Let x ∈ {0, 1}K represent the graph such that n ∼ m for all n,m ∈ Ai
and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Furthermore n ∼ m for all n ∈ A2 and all m ∈ A1 ⊔ A3; however,
n 6∼ m for any n ∈ A1 and m ∈ A3 [see Figure 4(c)]. This graph is connected but not
complete, so Proposition 4.4(b) says x ∈ Crit(XeqN ).
Now, let x1 represent the complete equivalence relation (
1∼) (i.e. n 1∼ m for all n,m ∈
[1...N ]. Let x2,x3 ∈ XeqN represent the equivalence relations ( 2∼) and ( 3∼), described as
follows [see Figure 4(d)]. First, we have n
i∼ m for all n,m ∈ Ai and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Next,
we have:
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(a)
(d)
x
(c)
x1 x2 x3
1
2
3
45
6
7
1
2
3
45
6
7
1
2
3
45
6
7
1
2
3
45
6
7
(b)
x1 x2 x3
A1
A3 A2
A1
A3 A2
A1
A3 A2
A1
A3 A2
Figure 4: (a,b): The proof of Proposition 4.12(b), case N = 7. (c,d): The proof of Proposition 4.12(c).
• n 2∼ m for all n ∈ A2 and m ∈ A3.
• n 3∼ m for all n ∈ A1 and m ∈ A2.
Define µ ∈ ∆∗3(XeqN ) by µ[xn] = 13 for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then Maj(µ) = x; thus, µ is
issue-wise indeterminate.
(d) For all d ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let xd be the element of X∆M,D which allocates all M dollars
towards claimant d. (Thus, for all m ∈ [1...M ], we have xdd,m = 1, while xdc,m = 0
for all c ∈ [1...D] \ {d}.) Define µ ∈ ∆∗3(X∆M,D) by µ[xd] = 13 for d = 1, 2, 3. Then
Maj(µ) = 0, so Theorem 2.5 implies that Cond
(
X∆M,D, µ
)
= X∆M,D, hence µ is issue-wise
indeterminate, by Theorem 4.3(a). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.13.
(a) Let I ′ := K − J and J ′ := K − I; then I ′ ≤ J ′.
Claim 1: η(XcomI′,J ′;K) = η(X
com
I,J ;K).
Proof: For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , define x′ := (¬xk)Kk=1. For any µ ∈ ∆({0, 1}K), define
µ′(x) := µ(x′) for all x ∈ {0, 1}K ; then clearly Maj(µ′) = Maj(µ)′. In particular,
Maj(µ) = 0 if and only if Maj(µ′) = 1. It is easy to check that XcomI′,J ′;K := {x′;
x ∈ XcomI,J ;K}; thus, ∆∗N(XcomI′,J ′;K) := {µ′; µ ∈ ∆∗N(XcomI,J ;K)}.
Lemma A.8 says that Crit(XcomI,J ;K) = {0,1} = Crit(XcomI′,J ′;K). Thus,
η(XcomI,J ;K) = min
{
N ∈ N ; ∃ µ ∈ ∆∗N(XcomI,J ;K) with Maj(µ) = 0 or 1
}
= min
{
N ∈ N ; ∃ µ ∈ ∆∗N(XcomI,J ;K) with Maj(µ′) = 1 or 0
}
= min
{
N ∈ N ; ∃ µ′ ∈ ∆∗N(XcomI′,J ′;K) with Maj(µ′) = 1 or 0
}
= η(XcomI′,J ′;K),
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as claimed. 3 Claim 1
Now, K − 2I ′ = 2J − K and 2J ′ − K = K − 2I. Thus, min{ K
K−2I′
, K
2J ′−K
}
=
min
{
K
K−2I
, K
2J−K
}
. This, together with Claim 1, means that the inequality (10) holds
for XcomI,J ;K , J andK if and only if it holds for X
com
I′,J ′;K , J
′ andK ′; thus, we can substitute
one problem for the other. Furthermore, if K − 2I < 2J −K, then K − 2I ′ ≥ 2J −K ′.
Thus, by exchanging XcomI′,J ′;K for X
com
I,J ;K if necessary, we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that K − 2I ≥ 2J −K. Since I ≤ J , this implies K − 2I ≥ 0; hence K/2 ≥ I.
Thus, η(XcomI,J ;K) ≤ min{N ∈ N; ∃ µ ∈ ∆∗N(XcomI,J ;K) with Maj(µ) = 0}.
For all x in the support of µ,
∑
k xk ≥ I; thus,
∑
k µk ≥ I. Thus, µk ≥ I/K, for some
k ∈ [1 . . . K]. On the other hand, 0 = Maj(µ) if and only if µk < 12 for all k. Thus,
0 = Maj(µ) if and only if
I
K
≤ max
k
µk <
1
2
.
Suppose that the number of voters N is odd. For profiles µ to exist satisfying the latter
inequality, one must have N−1
2N
≥ I
K
, i.e. N ≥ K
K−2I
as claimed. (The case when N is
even is similar.)
(b)[i] We first illustrate the argument in the case Xcom4,6;11. In this case,
I
K−2I
= 4
3
∈ (1, 2],
so N = 2, and the theorem claims that η(Xcom4,6;11) ≤ 5. We will construct an issue-wise
indeterminate profile with five voters. Define
x1 := (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
x2 := (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
x3 := (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1);
x4 := (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
and x5 := (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0).
Define µ ∈ ∆∗5(Xcom4,6;11) by µ[xk] = 15 for k = 1, . . . , 5. The clearly Maj(µ) = 0 ∈
Crit(Xcom4,6;11). Thus, µ is issue-wise indeterminate, by Theorem 4.3(a).
The general construction is similar. For any z ∈ Z, let [z] be the unique element of
[1...K] such that z ≡ [z] (mod K). Then, for all n ∈ [0 . . . 2N+1], define kn := [n I].
Next, for all n ∈ [0...2N ], let Jn denote the ‘interval between’ kn and (kn+1) − 1 in a
‘mod K’ sense. That is:
• if 1 ≤ kn ≤ (kn+1)− 1 ≤ K, then Jn := {kn, kn + 1, . . . , (kn+1)−1}.
• if 1 ≤ (kn+1)− 1 ≤ kn ≤ K, then Jn := {kn, kn + 1, . . . , K} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , (kn+1)−1}.
Finally, for all n ∈ [0...2N ], let xn := 1Jn . Then xn ∈ XcomI,J ;K because ‖xn‖ = |Jn| = I.
Now, define µ ∈ ∆∗2N+1(XcomI,J ;K) by µ[xn] = 1/(2N + 1) for all n ∈ [0...2N ]. I claim that
Maj(µ) = 0.
To see this, recall that N :=
⌈
I
K − 2I
⌉
≥ I
K − 2I . Manipulating this inequality yields
(2N + 1)I ≤ NK. This means that the sequence k0, k1, . . . , k2N+1 ‘wraps around’
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the interval [1...K] at most N times. This means that for each k ∈ [1...K], we have
|{n ∈ [0...2N ] ; k ∈ Jn}| ≤ N . Thus, µk(1) ≤ N/(2N + 1) < 12 . Thus, Majk(µ) = 0.
This holds for all k ∈ [1...K], so Maj(µ) = 0. But 0 ∈ Crit(XcomI,J ;K); thus, µ is issue-wise
indeterminate, by Theorem 4.3(a).
The proof of (b)[ii] is similar; simply reverse the roles of ‘0’ and ‘1’ in the proof of (b)[i].
2
Proof of Proposition 5.3. The space {1k}k∈K ∪{1} is McGarvey by Proposition 6.2(b) of
Nehring and Pivato (2011a); moreover, any superset of a McGarvey space is clearly also
McGarvey. It remains to show that X does not admit a panopticon. By definition, a
panopticon must lie outside X. Thus, 0 ∈ {0, 1}K cannot be a panopticon for X because
any 1k is between 0 and 1. Thus consider x 6∈ XC with x 6= 0. By assumption, x must
have at least two ones, say xℓ = 1 and xm = 1 with ℓ 6= m, and at least one zero, say
xh = 0 for h 6∈ {ℓ,m}. But then, the element 1ℓ ∈ XC is between the elements x and
1h ∈ XC, i.e. x is not a panopticon. 2
We will use the following simple but elegant result of Szele (1943).
Lemma A.9 The expected number of directed Hamiltonian paths which exist in a ran-
domly generated tournament (where all edges are independent random variables with both
orientations having equal probability) is given by N !
2N−1
.
Proof: There are N ! directed Hamiltonian chains through [1...N ]. For any such chain, and
any random tournament, there is a probability 1/2N−1 that the chain can be embedded
in the tournament (because each of the N − 1 edges of the chain has probability 1/2
of being compatible with the corresponding edge in the tournament, and these N − 1
events are all independent random variables). 2
Proof of Proposition 6.1. (a) Lemma A.9 says there exists a tournament on [1...N ] (i.e.
an element x ∈ {0, 1}K) with at least N !
2N−1
distinct Hamiltonian chains. The theorem
of McGarvey (1953) says there is some µ ∈ ∆(XprN ) with Maj(µ) = x; then Proposition
2.1(a) says that |Cond (XprN , µ) | ≥
N !
2N−1
. Thus,
h(XprN ) ≥ h(µ) =
log2 |Cond (XprN , µ) |
log2 |XprN |
≥ log2(N !)− log2(2
N−1)
log2(N !)
= 1− N − 1
log2(N !)
(∗)≈ 1− N − 1
(N + 1
2
) log2(N)−N log2(e) + log2(
√
2π)
≈ 1− 1
log2(N)
−−−−
N→∞
→ 1.
Here (∗) is because Stirling’s formula says N ! ≈ √2πN (N
e
)N
.
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(b) Fix c ∈ (0, 1). Let L := ⌊cN⌋ and let R := N − L. Let x ∈ {0, 1}K represent the
complete bipartite graph which has L ‘left’ vertices and R ‘right’ vertices, where every
left vertex is linked to every right vertex (but there are no links between any two left
vertices or any two right vertices). The space XeqN is McGarvey (Nehring and Pivato,
2011a, Example 3.9(a)), so there exists some µ ∈ ∆∗(XeqN ) such that Maj(µ) = x. Let
Y ⊆ XeqN be the set of all equivalence relations defined as follows:
• Fix M ∈ [1 . . . L]. Partition the set of right-hand vertices into exactly M disjoint
subsets R1, R2, . . . , RM (some of which may be empty).
• Let the left-hand vertices be v1, v2, . . . , vL. For all m ∈ [1 . . .M ], declare every
element of Rm to be equivalent to vm and equivalent to every other element of Rm.
• Declare vM , . . . , vL to be equivalent to one another and equivalent to every element
of RM .
Claim 1: Y ⊆ Cond (XeqN , µ).
Proof: Given any y ∈ Y , we will construct a path γ such that F γ(µ) = y. We do this as
follows:
1. For each m ∈ [1 . . .M ], and each vertex r ∈ Rm, the path γ first visits the
coordinate (vm, r); in every one of these coordinates, the majority prevails, so we
get F γ(vm,r)(µ) = x(vm,r) = 1 = y(vm,r) (encoding the equivalence vm ∼ r).
2. At this point, for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ] and all r, r′ ∈ Rm, transitivity constraints force
r ∼ r′ —i.e. we get F γ(r,r′)(µ) = 1 = y(r,r′).
3. Next, for each m, ℓ ∈ [1 . . .M ] with m 6= ℓ, the path γ visits the coordinate
(vm, vℓ). Again, the majority prevails, so F
γ
(vm,vℓ)
(µ) = x(vm,vℓ) = 0 = y(vm,vℓ)
(encoding the nonequivalence vm 6∼ vℓ).
4. At this point, for all m, ℓ ∈ [1 . . .M ] with m 6= ℓ, and all r ∈ Rm and r′ ∈ Rℓ,
transitivity constraints force r 6∼ r′ —i.e. we get F γ(r,r′) = 0 = y(r,r′).
5. Next, for each m, ℓ ∈ [M . . . L], the path γ visits the coordinate (vm, vℓ). Again,
the majority prevails, so F γ(vm,vℓ)(µ) = x(vm,vℓ) = 1 = y(vm,vℓ) (encoding vm ∼ vℓ).
6. At this point, for all ℓ ∈ [M . . . L] and all r ∈ RM , transitivity constraints force
vℓ ∼ r —i.e. we get F γ(vℓ,r)(µ) = 1 = y(vℓ,r) (encoding vℓ ∼ r).
7. Finally, visit the remaining coordinates in some arbitrary order. (The values
for these coordinates are already completely determined by the transitivity con-
straints in steps 2, 4, and 6).
At this point, we have F γk (µ) = yk for all k ∈ [1...K], as desired. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: |Y | ≥ LR+1/(R + 1).
Proof: For any fixed M ∈ [1 . . . L], let YM be the elements of Y obtained by partitioning
the right-hand vertices into M subsets (labelled by v1, . . . , vM , and some possibly
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empty). Then |YM | =MR (because any such partition corresponds to a function from
the R right-hand vertices into {v1, . . . , vM}). Now, Y = Y1 ⊔ Y2 ⊔ · · · ⊔ YM , so
|Y | = |Y1|+ |Y2|+ · · ·+ |YL| = 1R + 2R + · · ·+ LR
≥
∫ L
0
xR dx =
LR+1
R + 1
.
3 Claim 2
Claim 3: |XeqN | ≤ NN .
Proof: Any element of XeqN can represented by a partition of [1...N ] into N unlabelled
subsets (some of which may be empty). We can represent a labelled partition by a
function f : [1...N ]−→[1...N ]. There are NN such functions, and hence NN labelled
partitions. (Of course, many of these labelled partitions correspond to the same
unlabelled partition.) Thus, |XeqN | ≤ NN . 3 Claim 3
Thus,
h(XeqN ) ≥
log2 |Cond (XeqN , µ) |
log2 |XeqN |
≥
(∗)
log2(L
R+1/(R + 1))
log2(N
N)
=
(R + 1) log2(L)− log2(R + 1)
N log2(N)
≈
(†)
[(1− c)N + 1] log2(cN)− log2((1− c)N + 1)
N log2(N)
≈ [(1− c)N + 1] [log2(N) + log(c)]− log2(1− c)− log2(N))
N log2(N)
−−−−
N→∞
→ (1− c).
Here, (∗) is by Claims 1, 2 and 3, while (†) is because L = ⌊cN⌋ ≈ cN , so that
R = N − L ≈ N − cN = (1− c)N .
However, c can be any value in (0, 1). By letting c→0, we conclude that h(XeqN ) ≥ 1;
hence h(XeqN ) = 1, as desired.
(c) Let C lineK be the linear graph convexity on [1...K], with the standard ordering. The
convex subsets of C lineK are the intervals [j . . . k] for any j ≤ k ∈ [1...K]. Let J := {k ∈
[1...K]; k odd}. Note that 1J ∈ Maj(X lineK ) because X lineK is McGarvey by Proposition
4.7. For any j ≤ k ∈ [1...K], we have 1[j...k] ≍ 1J if and only if j and k are both odd.
Thus, |X lineK (1J)| ≥ 14 |X lineK | (since at least one quarter of the subintervals of [1...K] have
two odd endpoints). Thus,
h(X lineK ) ≥
log2(
1
4
|X lineK |)
log2 |X lineK |
=
log2 |X lineK | − 2
log2 |X lineK |
−−−−
K→∞
→ 1.
Thus, X lineK is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
(d) Let D ∈ N, let K = 2D, and let ϕ : [1...K]−→{0, 1}D be some bijection. Let
C2D be the hypercube convexity on {0, 1}D, and define Φ : P({0, 1}D)−→{0, 1}K by
Φ(C) := 1ϕ−1(C) for all C ⊆ {0, 1}D. Then define X2D := Φ[C2D] ⊂ {0, 1}K . Finally, let
E := {x ∈ {0, 1}D; ‖x‖ is even}, and define e := Φ[E] ∈ {0, 1}K .
Claim 4: For any C ∈ C2D, if |C| > 2, and c := Φ(C) ∈ X2D, then c ≍ e.
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Proof: Let B ∈ C2D and let b := Φ(B) ∈ X2D. Suppose b is strictly between c and e.
Then C ∩ E ⊆ B ∩ E and C∁ ∩ E∁ ⊆ B∁ ∩ E∁.
Now, if C ∩E ⊆ B∩E, then C ∩E ⊆ B. Thus, conv(C ∩E) ⊆ B (because B ∈ C2D).
But if |C| > 2, then the definition of E is such that conv(C ∩E) = C. Thus, C ⊆ B.
Thus, |B| > 2 also.
Meanwhile, if C∁∩E∁ ⊆ B∁∩E∁, then C ∩E∁ ⊇ B∩E∁. Thus B∩E∁ ⊂ C. Thus,
conv(B ∩E∁) ⊆ C (because C ∈ C2D). But if |B| > 2, then the definition of E is such
that conv(B ∩ E∁) = B. Thus B ⊆ C.
We conclude that B = C, which means b = c, as desired. 3 Claim 4
Claim 5: |X2D| = 3D.
Proof: |X2D| = |C2D|, and |C2D| consists of all subcubes of {0, 1}D. There is a bijective
correspondence between these subcubes and the set of {0, 1}-valued functions whose
domain is any subset of [1...D]. Any such function can be represented in a unique
way by an element of {0, 1, ∗}D (see Notation A.2). Thus, |X2D| = |{0, 1, ∗}D| = 3D.
3 Claim 5
Let Y := {x ∈ X2D; x represents a subcube of cardinality 1 or 2 in {0, 1}D.
Claim 6: |Y | = (1 + D
2
) 2D.
Proof: Clearly, {0, 1}D has exactly 2D subcubes of cardinality 1 (i.e. vertices). To obtain
a subcube of cardinality 2 (i.e. an edge), we start at one of these 2D vertices and then
move to one of its D nearest neighbours. There are D · 2D ways to do this, but we
have then counted every edge twice, so there are actually D
2
2D edges. 3 Claim 6
Thus, if D is large enough, then
|X2D(e)| ≥
(∗)
|X2D| − |Y | (†) 3D −
(
1 +
D
2
)
2D
= 3D
(
1−
(
1 +
D
2
)
·
(
2
3
)D)
≥
(‡)
1
2
3D,
where (∗) is by Claim 4, (†) is by Claims 5 and 6, and (‡) is because lim
D→∞
(
1 +
D
2
)(
2
3
)D
=
0. Thus,
log2 |X2D(e)| ≥ log2
(
1
2
3D
)
= D · log2(3)− 1. (A3)
Now, e ∈ Maj(X2D) because X2D is McGarvey by Proposition 4.7. Thus
h(X2D) ≥
log2 |X2D(e)|
log2 |X2D|
≥
(∗)
D · log2(3)− 1
log2 |3D|
=
D · log2(3)− 1
D · log2(3)
−−−−
D→∞
→ 1,
where (∗) is by eqn.(A3) and Claim 5. Thus, X2D is asymptotically totally indeterminate.
2
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